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Abstract 
Self-monitoring research has developed into a significant literature that spans 
across disciplines. However, little research has examined the influence of self-
monitoring on the development of the self-concept, which sets the stage for the 
current research endeavor. In the first study, it was hypothesized that directional 
questions "Are you extraverted?" would influence the self-concept of self-monitors to 
a greater extent, as they would be more likely to generate supporting thoughts which 
would mediate this effect. Findings generally supported the end effect of the 
hypothesis, but not the mediating process with high self-monitors reported a greater 
change in self-ratings after receiving a directional question. While low self-monitors 
were influenced more by thoughts that they retrieved in response to directional 
questions. 
The second study tested the assumptions of a proposed model of self-concept 
development that implicated self-monitoring as playing a central role. Self-
monitoring correlated significantly and positively with similar magnitude with both 
communication and psychological measures. These results point to self-monitoring 
being both a communication and psychology measure. Participants' self-ratings 
changed on most domains of the Big Five traits from time 1 to time 2 indicating that 
appraisal of both communication acts and psychological traits influenced their self-
concept as the findings of these two studies support 
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Preface 
The focus of this research project was to examine how individuals 
construct their self-concept through interaction style, and how their pre-existing 
interaction style affects how people integrate social cues, and encode and decode 
messages. Currently no research exists regarding the role or relationship of ongoing 
interaction to the dynamic nature of social cognition, especially how communication 
and one' s self monitoring function. It was hypothesized that high self-monitors will 
be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept between the first and second 
session on their self-rated trait that was assessed with the directional question; and 
that high self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept based 
on the quantity of thoughts generated. 
There is a great justification for and significance of the problem being 
addressed. Communication research has recently started to integrate concepts of 
cognition as explanations of communication behavior. This includes emphasis on 
structures, input and the process of the creation of communication. These are 
important aspects of social cognition, yet lack the "social" facet aspect of social 
cognition. The aspect of individuals' motivation and goals are neglected and focus is 
placed on the generic mapping of the cognitive mechanisms that affect 
communication. Self-monitoring is an important construct in both disciplines as it 
serves as a theoretical link between psychology and communication in regards to both 
interaction style and self-concept and may help bridge the disciplines together. 
Self-monitoring is a construct that has been implicated as an important 
moderator in classical areas of psychology such as attitude/behavior congruence, 
v 
differential bases of attraction and friendship selection and cross-situational 
consistency. It has also become an important construct in the field of communication 
studies. As both disciplines converge to the similar theoretical basis of social 
cognition, both fields would benefit from research that is interdisciplinary in nature 
and uses constructs that are germane to both perspectives, such as self-monitoring. 
However, very little research in either discipline has examined the impact of self-
monitoring on the malleability of self-concept using a social cognitive methodology. 
A series of studies were conducted to further stimulate interdisciplinary 
research in these two fields. Study 1 examined the influence of directional questions 
on self-concept and the influence of self-monitoring. Study 2 tentatively tested a 
proposed model of the development of self-concept and its subsequent assumptions in 
which self-monitoring plays a central role in integrating both communication and 
psychological perspectives. The two studies support the model. 
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Introduction 
Scholars and pedagogues have attended to social cognition, or how one 
perceives the self, as central or integral to explaining and understanding human 
interaction. Sociologists Mead ( 1934) and Cooley ( 1902) developed symbolic 
interactionism and it's associated processes of co construction of juxtaposed social 
reality, meanings, and the self. A body ofresearch exists (Cappella, 1981) that firmly 
establishes the influence of input on social cognition from significant others and 
social comparison. However, currently no research exists regarding the role or 
relationship of ongoing interaction to the dynamic nature of social cognition, 
especially how communication and one' s self monitoring function. The focus of this 
research project is to examine how individuals construct their self-concept through 
interaction style, and how their pre-existing interaction style affects how people 
integrate social cues, and encode and decode messages. 
Concomitant to the joint construction of selves through interaction with others 
is the social cognition process of creating, noticing, verifying, and recreating one's 
self-concept. Affirmation or disconfirmation of one's self concept by another is also 
coupled with the simultaneous reciprocity of acceptance or rejection of the other's 
self concept as interaction proceeds. Negotiating the self-concept with another 
requires an individual to engage at some level in what Snyder (1974) identified as 
self-monitoring. Self-monitoring has been defined as the amount of expressive 
control than an individual has across various situations (Snyder, 1974). To further 
explicate the relational importance of self-monitoring and communication, it can be 
assumed that self-monitoring, a fundamental interaction style (i.e. one is either low or 
2 
high) is fostered through both intrapersonal and interpersonal communication. High 
self-monitors are more socially skilled than low self-monitors (Ickes & Barnes, 
1977), and as a result appear friendlier (Lippa, 1976). They can communicate more 
emotional states, are more likely to initiate conversations, have good self-control, and 
are better at discerning the meaning of nonverbal communication than low self-
monitor. (Snyder, 1979). Hence, self-monitoring is created and sustained through the 




Communication research has recently started to integrate concepts of 
cognition as explanations of communication behavior. Terms such as script, schema, 
prototype, motivation and goals are typically used in communication research. For 
example, Schank (1982a) proposes a dynamic memory theory in which 
communication memory is constantly changing in response to experiences, memory 
is dynamic rather than static. Changes occur by creating, altering, and updating 
scenes, the building blocks of memory. This theory is similar to the psychological 
theory of self-schema/working self-concept (Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986), 
in which individuals have a dynamic self-concept that changes with goals, motivation 
and any event that makes parts of the self-concept more accessible. These two 
theories provide similar accounts of the same phenomenon. In essence, they differ on 
the content of input, such that dynamic memory theory is focused on scenes, while 
self-schema is focused on any event or motivation that makes aspects of self-concept 
3 
more accessible. The process of integration is the same in both theories. They both 
have a structure that an individual changes based on interaction, while self-schema or 
the working self-concept is more encompassing in that other factors influence change. 
Since social cognition is a relatively new approach in communication 
research, the cognitive communication foundation is still being established. 
Communication researchers typically focus on the interpretative and choice-making 
powers while explaining interaction and explain their processes in a cognitively 
grounded manner (McPhee, 1995). This includes emphasis on structures, input, and 
the process of the creation of communication. These are important aspects of social 
cognition, yet lack the "social" aspect of social cognition. People are not solely 
information-processing computers. This is an issue that psychology addressed as 
social cognition research grew. The aspect of individuals' motivation and goals are 
neglected and focus is placed on the generic mapping of the cognitive mechanisms 
that affect communication. 
Since research on the cognitive aspects of communication is still developing, 
interdisciplinary collaboration may contribute information that will provide a more 
complete picture of the cognitive aspects of communication. Motivation and goals 
are issues that McPhee ( 1995) has discussed as being less emphasized in social 
cognitive communication research; they can be introduced by studying self-
monitoring, a psychological construct that focuses on an individual's motivation and 
goals with respect to her or his interaction with the other. High self-monitors are 
motivated to be socially appropriate; thus they communicate with others in this 
manner. This desire and how successfully appropriate they are in communicating 
then in turn will influence their self-concept. 
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Self-monitoring also ties in the reciprocal influence of self-concept and 
communication. Goss (1989) stresses since "we build our self-concepts with 
interactions with others, self-monitoring influences our self-concept, as self-monitors 
examine their self-concept 'in action"'(p. 88). Therefore, self-monitoring is an 
important construct in both disciplines as it serves as a theoretical link between 
psychology and communication in regards to both interaction style and self-concept. 
Self-Concept 
The self-concept, or how the individual sees the self, has been an area of 
research interest for quite some time. Certain perspectives have found that the self-
concept is stable; individuals actively try to reinforce their established self-concept, 
while other perspectives have found that the self-concept is malleable. A more 
contemporary perspective is that the self-concept is both malleable and stable, 
depending upon what structure of the self-concept is being discussed or theorized. 
This thesis discusses both sides of the argument surrounding the nature of self-
concept. Following the discussion of the various perspectives and their 
corresponding research, is a more in-depth focus on the malleable (impressionable, 
and changeable) nature of the self-concept. This thesis also addresses the processes 
that have been theorized as responsible for the change in self-concept. This section 
will conclude with research that frames the current empirical question that will be 
posed. One thrust derived from this literature review is an assessment of the role that 
directional questions, and consequent retrieved memories associated with them, play 
in changing one's working self-concept. 
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The second section examines the construct of self-monitoring; a construct that 
may provide qualifications of when directional questions elicit biased memory 
searches with the resulting change in self-concept. Scant research has examined the 
self-concept of low and high self-monitors. A cogent approach to examining the self-
monitoring literature would be to review the literature that is the most significant to 
the current research question. The researcher claims that the variability of a high self-
monitor's self-concept is more loosely defined than a low self-monitor's self-concept, 
which will then result in a high self-monitor's self-concept being more amenable to 
change when presented with a directional question. Thus various relevant areas of 
research were unpacked and are presented: stability of the self-concept; malleability 
of the self-concept; motivational bases of the self-concept etc .. 
The first area that will be discussed involves differences in cross-situational 
variability of the low and high self-monitor. The author assumes that a more 
situationally variable person, such as a high self-monitor, will have a less consistent 
self-concept than a low self-monitor. The second area of inquiry involves research on 
differences between the attitude/behavior relationship of the low and high self-
monitor. This research provides insight into the dynamic self-concept of the high 
self-monitor. The final area of research reviewed discusses the different types of 
social information to which a low self-monitor attends compared to a high self-
monitor. Since high self-monitors look to the situation for behavioral guidance, they 
should have a self-concept that is more inconsistent, as they have information about 
how to act in various situations, yet have no consistent self-guide. 
Stability of Self-Concept 
6 
The previously discussed notion of the self-concept can be defined as the 
constellation of categories that an individual uses to describe self. These categories 
span many levels of detail. These categories include country of origin, the region of 
the United States where an individual resides, level of self-monitoring, down to the 
traits that an individual uses to describe their personality, among others. These 
categories also consist of the types of roles that an individual uses when in the 
presence of others, how an individual interacts with others, and how typically other 
people have treated them in the past. Self-concept also has an evaluative component 
in that it is the repository of what type of regard an individual has for one's self. The 
self-concept is molded through social comparisons with other people and allows us to 
evaluate our standing among others on any issue that we choose to acknowledge. 
Now that self-concept has been conceptualized, one of the fundamental 
questions addressed in self-concept research is: Will I be tomorrow who I am today 
and who I was yesterday? Some researchers on self-concept claim that an 
individual's self-concept is relatively stable across the whole lifespan, or for a 
majority of the life span. For example, Mortimer and Lorence (1981) found that five 
dimensions of self-concept "including well being, self-doubts, sociability, 
competence, and unconventionality'' were stable from late adolescence to early 
adulthood. These results are significant, in that stability of the self-concept is held 
during a life period usually marked by instability and change. 
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Certain inherent characteristics of individuals affect their self-concepts. An 
individual may be white, female, with an average IQ. Self-perception of these 
qualities comprise the basis of the individual's self-concept. Individuals enact these 
qualities in differing degrees throughout their social interactions with others. Besides 
stable demographic features, individuals may have certain personality characteristics 
that are a predominant part of their self-concept. They may be extraverted or 
introverted, and this, in tum, affects their behaviors and attitudes toward others. 
These individuals may place themselves in certain situations that are characteristic of 
the self-concept. For example, Snyder and Gangestad (1982) reported that low self-
monitors, who have a self-concept that is internally constructed from their moods and 
beliefs, were more willing to enter situations that reflected their personal dispositions. 
High self-monitors, with a more situationally-based self-concept that is more 
situationally-based, were most willing to enter situations in which extraverted roles 
were clearly defined, such as being a meeting facilitator. 
Self-verification. Some researchers state that individuals actually engage in 
self-verification; that is, they actively try to reinforce their established self-concept. 
In interaction with others, individuals who want to verify their self-concept may try to 
draw the attention of others to certain traits or attitudes that they possess. Swann and 
Read ( 1980) discuss a variety of these self-verification techniques that individuals 
use, which include social, behavioral and cognitive means. 
One technique used for self-verification is to seek out social feedback that 
readily confirms an individual's self-concept. Swann and Read (1980) found that 
individuals who perceived themselves as being '<unlikable" would spend more time 
reading negative statements that their partner produced about them, while "likable" 
individuals would spend more time reading positive statements that their partners 
produced. 
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Individuals also engage in self-verification by behaviorally eliciting responses 
that confirm their self-concept. Swann and Read (1980) found that individuals that 
perceived themselves as being likable elicited more favorable reactions from partners. 
The amount ofliking was statistically mediated by individuals' increased praises to 
their partner, and this effect was stronger when they believed that the partner had a 
negative impression of them. 
Individuals also confirm their self-concept through their cognitive processes. 
Swann and Read ( 1980) found that individuals that perceived themselves as being 
likable recalled more positive than negative evaluative statements that their partner 
made about them. Similarly, Markus (1977) found that schematic individuals (or 
individuals that have a self schema that is strongly characterized by a particular trait) 
would be less willing to accept information that was incongruent with their schema. 
Thus, on the basis of the research reviewed to this point, it appears that the self does 
seem to remain stable, and that individuals actively try to maintain this conception of 
self through self-verification. 
The Self-Concept as Malleable 
Markus and Kunda ( 1986), and numerous other psychology researchers, 
propose that the self-concept may be both stable and malleable. Inside the more 
stable, general self-concept, Markus and Kunda (1986) believe that there is a working 
self-concept, or a malleable self-concept that individuals have for the current moment 
9 
in time. Markus and Kunda (1986), drawing from Bern's (1972) self-perception 
theory, posit that the working self-concept is affected by our current motivations and 
goals and the norms of social situations. These working self-concepts guide behavior 
in how individuals should act in the current situation. Once individuals leave a social 
situation, they may employ a different working self-concept, although in contrast, 
they still maintain a stable, general self-concept that was intact across these social 
situations. They should still recognize the self as a member of their respective gender 
category, yet their perception of their level of a more abstract concept, such as a 
personality trait, may be higher or lower. 
Self-concept can be less rigid than previously thought, based on the context or 
the phenomenological experience associated with social stimuli (Markus, 1977). 
Aschematic individuals (or individuals who did not attribute a trait in question as 
being characteristic of their self-concept) were more inconsistent in their responses 
when asked to indicate whether the trait was indicative of self or not. This result is 
significant on numerous fronts. First, it supports the idea that the self is not solely 
stable, underscoring the capacity of the self-concept to be both stable and malleable. 
Another important consideration from Markus's (1977) study provides guidance to 
what aspects of the self-concept are malleable and which processes germane to this 
plasticity. Perhaps individuals have a self-concept that is rigidly stable on some 
characteristics of their personality, while other aspects are less rigid, and may 
possibly change with situations or goals. 
Motivational Bases. Much of the literature on the malleability of self-concept 
emphasizes the self-esteem needs of individuals. When an individual feels too unique 
lO 
or similar to everyone else, they may be motivated to change their self-concept to 
establish a social comparative equilibrium. Markus and Kunda (1986) capitalized on 
this prospect, and investigated the malleability of self-concept through use of a 
traditional research paradigm in which individuals experienced one of these two 
socially undesirable outcomes. 
Markus and Kunda (1986) posited that these differing states are aversive 
states to the self-concept, and will have a significant impact on the working self-
concept. To reduce threat to the working self-concept, the researchers theorized that 
individuals would attempt to conscript memories that stress the opposite state. In 
other words, if people are made to feel overly different from others, they will retrieve 
memories or behaviors that implicate their similarity with others. If people feel 
overly similar with others, they retrieve memories in which their behaviors were 
different from other individuals. The cognitive act of retrieving either type of 
memory has processing implications, which reduces response latencies when deciding 
whether a word (reflective of the retrieved memory) is self-descriptive or not. 
Markus and Kunda ( 1986) found that participants who were told that they 
were overly unique or similar from others did not differ on their choices of either 
unique or similar items when describing themselves, providing evidence that the 
general self-concept is stable. However, participants made to feel unique had shorter 
response latency times when deciding if conforming words were descriptive of them, 
indicating that their working self-concept may have activated memories or concepts 
in which the participant was similar to others. This pattern extended to participants 
who were made to feel similar to others. In a word association task, participants 
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made to feel unique later associated uniqueness with negative terms, and similarity 
with positive terms. Thus, a valence is attached to certain memories or structures 
associated with one's self-concept. Markus and Kunda (1986) indicate that the 
individual's working self-concept is malleable, and can change ifthere is a 
motivational basis behind the change. Individuals theoretically conduct a memory 
search through their past experiences, trying to find those particular events that fulfill 
the current need. The individual may define their current self-concept based on their 
most recent communication style or active memory structure. This theory captures 
the malleability and fleeting characteristics that represent the self-concept, as 
evidenced by Markus ( 1977) and Markus and Kunda ( 1986). 
Kunda and Sanitioso (1988) believed that individuals recruit one-sided 
memories to support the hypothesis or theory and they neglect to look for memories 
that do not support the initial hypothesis. The researchers set up a paradigm in which 
they told students that a certain personality characteristic (either introversion or 
extraversion) was related to being successful in graduate school, something that is 
extremely desirable and self-esteem enhancing for most students. Kunda and 
Sanitioso ( 1988) then had students theorize why either introversion or extraversion 
would have a significant relationship with academic success. Kunda and Sanitioso 
(1988) found that students who developed theories of why one trait was important in 
being successful in graduate school, perceived themselves as having the trait to a 
greater extent. 
Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) examined the process that Kunda and 
Sanitioso ( 1988) had proposed, and found evidence that supported their proposal of a 
biased memory search when participants answered questions that assessed an 
individual's self-concept. Congruent self-concept memories that supported a 
supposedly desirable trait were more accessible to individuals. That is, when 
participants were told that a certain trait was more desirable, the participants 
conducted a biased memory search. This biased memory search activates these 
characteristics and they became more accessible than incongruent memories in the 
working self-concept. This was reflected through shorter response periods and one-
sided answers on memory-listing tasks reflecting the desirable trait. 
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Self-esteem, or how positive or negatively one evaluates self, which is also an 
evaluative component of self-concept, is also amenable to change when there is a 
motivational basis. Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, and Skelton (1981) examined the 
effects of strategic self-enhancement and self-deprecation on self-esteem. In this 
study, participants were involved in a mock interview where they had previously 
observed a confederate and were provided with incentives to use either a self-
deprecating or self-enhancing strategy. The strategy that they had used had a 
corresponding effect on their self-esteem. Participants had a higher self-esteem when 
they engaged in a self-enhancing strategy and a low self-esteem when they engaged 
in a self-deprecating strategy. This effect was replicated even when participants were 
explicitly told by the experimenters to act a certain way. This study shows that 
communication behaviors that are motivationally based can change self-esteem. 
Also, the process of pretending to act a certain way can affect self-esteem. 
Direction of Self-Concept Change. When individuals are presented with 
different social stimuli, either self- or other-initiated, individuals either accept or 
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reject integrating the information into their self-concept. When they do accept the 
information, it can either increase or decrease their perceived level of a trait in their 
self-concept. Rhodewalt and Agutsdottir ( 1986) discuss this concept when they 
describe the phenomenal self, a concept similar to Markus's and Kunda's (1986) 
working self-concept. Phenomenal self is a subset or collection of self-relevant 
information that is currently activated. Rhodewalt and Agutsdottir ( 1986) believe that 
individuals have certain latitudes of rejection or acceptance. That is, if a person 
engages in certain behaviors, acceptable to the self, the behavior falls within the 
latitude of acceptance. If a person engages in behaviors that fall outside the range of 
acceptable behaviors to the self, the behavior is in the latitude of rejection. 
If a behavior falls in the latitude of acceptance, individuals will engage in self-
perception processes whereby their self-concept will change, reflecting their attention 
to their current behavior. If the behavior falls in the latitude of rejection, the behavior 
will elicit cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is an aroused state in which the 
individual's behaviors do not match their attitudes, and they try to rectify this 
discrepancy through various processes. 
For example, Rhodewalt and Agutsdottir (1986) believed that participants 
would reduce cognitive dissonance by reporting that they were less like the self-
discrepant behavior elicited. The process of using either self-perception processes or 
experiencing cognitive dissonance is mediated by the individuals' self-knowledge of 
their behaviors. If someone has a developed self-knowledge structure and they 
engage in a self-discrepant behavior, he or she will experience cognitive dissonance, 
while a less developed structure will result in self-perception processes. 
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Rhodewalt and Agutsdottir ( 1986) found that depressives (depressed people) 
who had to act in a self-enhancing manner, and nondepressives (people who are not 
depressed) who had to act in a self-deprecating manner, felt cognitive dissonance, 
which had an opposing effect on their self-esteem. Depressives who acted in a self-
deprecating manner and nondepressives, acting in a self-enhancing manner, 
emphasized a change in self-esteem that reflected their behavior. These areas of 
research point to the role of motivational bases in changing self-esteem. Several 
studies assessed what effect, if any, certain types of questions would have. 
Can Self-Concept Change Without a Motivational Basis? 
One issue raised bt the preceding iswhether self-concept can change. Fazio, 
Effrein, and F al ender ( 1981) examined the effect that certain types of questions 
would have on an individual's self-concept. Fazio et al. (1981) proposed that asking 
certain types of self-directed questions without a motivational basis may prime or 
activate a different self-concept. In the study, individuals silently read questions to 
themselves and then answered them. The questions were either indicative of 
introversion or extraversion. Based on the type of questions asked, individuals 
actually answered in a manner similar to the type of questions. Individuals who 
asked themselves introverted questions responded in a less extraverted manner than 
individuals who asked themselves more extraverted questions. 
These questions influence participants' behavior Fazio et al. (1981) 
Individuals acted in either a more introverted or extraverted manner towards a 
confederate. These self-directed questions also affected the participant's self-
perception of their own introversion or extraversion. Participants who asked 
themselves introverted questions thought that they were more introverted than 
participants who asked themselves extraverted questions. Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, 
and Stock (1981) reported that participants who were asked to explain either failure 
or success on an upcoming anagram task resulted in the participants having either 
higher or lower expectations of behavior, which then translated into actual 
performance. 
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As previously discussed, the rationale for a third study was that a directional 
question would provoke individuals to think of memories that were one-sided in favor 
of the question. Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, and Reber (1993) conducted a study 
assessing whether asking an individual a directional question about one's introversion 
or extraversion influences their self-concept. Individuals will engage in a "positive-
test strategy" (Klayman & Ha, 1987), in which information will be found (in the form 
of memories) which supports the question and there will be a general lack of 
memories retrieved that do not support the question being asked. Kunda et al. (1993) 
constructed a research study in which participants answered a question about 
themselves, such as "Are you happy/unhappy with your social life?' Participants then 
listed any thoughts that answered the question. After listing their thoughts, 
participants then completed a self-rating scale that asked them to rate themselves on 
how happy or unhappy they were with their social life. Kunda et al. ( 1993) found that 
the directional question facilitated the retrieval of memories that answered the 
question in a one-sided manner, providing support for a biased memory search. 
Participants also rated themselves as being happy or unhappy with their social life 
(above or below neutral) based on this memory search. 
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In subsequent studies, Kunda et al. (1993) explored some of the parameters or 
the boundary conditions in which a change in self-concept was less likely to occur. 
Kunda et al. (1993) found that a directional question no longer had an effect on self-
concept if participants' perceived themselves as being more variable on the particular 
trait. Kunda et al. ( 1993) also found that participants' listed more two-sided thoughts 
when they described themselves as being more variable on the trait in question. 
Regarding Kunda et al.'s (1993) findings that an individuals' perceived 
variability on a trait has a significant relationship on two-sided thoughts listed and 
also subsequent self-ratings; and arose the usage of a personal characteristic to 
account for these differences. The personal characteristic that can most likely 
account for these differences is an individual's differences in self-monitoring 
(Snyder, 1974). According to Snyder (1974), self-monitoring can be described as the 
degree to which an individual can "monitor their self-presentation or communication 
style, expressive behavior, and verbal affective display'' (p. 527). In other words, 
high self-monitors are able to put on the right "social mask" when it is called upon, 
while low self-monitors tend to follow their internal dispositions and present 
themselves in a way that is a reflective of how they feel or think during a given 
moment rather than what is perceived to be "socially correct" or "expected" in that 
situation. The Kunda et. al (1993) work allows the bridge between self-concept and 
self-monitoring. 
Self-Monitoring as a Construct 
Self-monitoring has been defined as the amount of expressive control than an 
individual has across various situations (Snyder, 1974). Low self-monitors are 
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typically thought of as individuals who let their moods or general dispositions on 
various issues guide their behaviors or outward expressions when they are interacting 
with those around them. If a low self-monitor is interacting within a group, they 
typically reveal their true self through what they say, or how they behave with 
outward expressions of emotion. The low self-monitors' behavior is consistent across 
situations. High self-monitors are typically thought of as individuals who have no 
consistent base of behaviors, as they are typically change their own behaviors to fit 
the social situation. They mask or hide their "true self' constantly changing their 
expressions based upon the external, or rather the social stimuli of which they find 
themselves a part. The high self-monitors' behavior is inconsistent across situations, 
because it adapts to changing situations. 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
One way to better discern who a self-monitor is involves examining the 
factors that compose the original Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Snyder 
(1974) stated that self-monitoring consists of five aspects: (a) concern with being 
socially appropriate in one's presentation; (b) attention to social comparison 
information as cues to appropriate expression; (c) the ability to control and modify 
one's self-presentation; (d) being able to use this ability in particular situations; and 
(e) the consistency of behavior across situations (Snyder, 1974). 
The Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) was validated through various 
procedures and appears to be both a psychologically meaningful and unified 
construct. However, other researchers have argued that Snyder's (1974) Self-
Monitoring Scale consists of more than one latent variable. Briggs, Cheek, and Buss 
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(1980) found that the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) consisted of three 
distinct factors: acting, extraversion, and other-directedness, which all lacked 
significant intercorrelations with regards to the independent factors. Various other 
factor-analytic studies support the claim that the Self-Monitoring Scale consists of 
multiple independent factors (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; 
Nowack & Kammer, 1987; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Some studies have found as 
many as four factors (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) while others have found two general 
factors (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; John, Cheek, & Klohnen, 1996) in the Self-
Monitoring Scale. 
Based on their data, Briggs et al. (1980) warrant caution in conceptualizing 
self-monitoring as a unitary construct. Briggs et al. ( 1980) found that other-
directedness, the willingness to change one's behavior to suit others, was positively 
correlated with neuroticism and shyness, and negatively correlated with self-esteem. 
While extraversion, was negatively correlated with neuroticism and shyness, and 
positively correlated with a different measure of extraversion. 
Another concern is the construct of self-monitoring is not truly 
operationalized in the Self-Monitoring Scale. Snyder and Gangstad (2000) state that 
the self-monitoring scale is a valid measure of self-monitoring because of its intrinsic 
validity. Hence, hundreds of studies have shown a significant difference when people 
were assessed on their self-monitoring. 
Mi ell and Le Voi (1985) found that using the three subscales of the Self-
Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974), (derived from Briggs et al., 1980) in analysis were 
more useful predictors than employing the scale as a whole. Mi ell and Le Voi ( 1985) 
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replicated the same type of patterns as Briggs et al. (1980). Some subscales of the 
Self-Monitoring Scale went in the opposite direction of the other subscales when they 
were used in analysis. Therefore, the predictive utility of the scale was lowered when 
subscales that are moving in opposite directions were combined. Dividing self-
monitoring into three constructs when conducting analyses has also been utilized in 
other studies (Carver, 1989; Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991; Richmond, Craig, & 
Ruzicka, 1991; Snyder and Gangestad, 1986; Sullivan & Hamish, 1990). 
Results like Miell and Le Voi's (1985), and Briggs et al.'s (1980) classic 
factor analytic study started to create doubt among researchers about the meaning of 
self-monitoring as developed by Snyder (1974) and measured by the Self-Monitoring 
Scale (Snyder, 1974). Not taking these criticisms lightly, Snyder and Gangestad 
( 1986) wrote a rebuttal directly to Briggs et al. (1980) and Miell and Le Voi ( 1985) in 
which they claim that self-monitoring is a psychologically meaningful construct and 
does measure one main underlying factor. 
Snyder and Gangestad (1986) provide support for self-monitoring from 
various sources. One critical source of support is strong empirical findings when self-
monitoring has been used as a way to differentiate individuals. This point serves as 
an indirect statement of the reliability of a construct. According to Snyder and 
Gangestad (1986), simply relying on factor analysis to determine a scale's internal 
structure may ignore a more complex phenomenon, which has been found to be 
significant in numerous studies. 
Gangestad and Snyder ( 1985) also cite direct support for the construct by 
reanalyzing studies of self-monitoring and conducting analyses of the internal 
structure of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Through the use of a 
taxometric analysis, Gangestad and Snyder ( 1985) found that their measure of self-
monitoring does tap an underlying causal variable. 
Self-Monitoring Scale Assessment 
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In a later analysis, Briggs and Cheek (1988) found that there were two factors 
that composed the Self-Monitoring Scale, not one, and that the first factor correlated 
with extraversion, exhibitionism, and social potency. Briggs and Cheek ( 1988) also 
discuss some of the problems with the general theoretical approach taken in the 
development of the self-monitoring concept from inception to the current time (e.g. 
Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1988). One problem 
that Briggs and Cheek ( 1988) identified that it is assumed that a person is either a 
high or low self-monitor, instead of being placed on a continuum of self-monitoring. 
Miller and Thayer ( 1989) also support the claim that self-monitoring may not be a 
discrete class variable. Miller and Thayer ( 1989) conducted analyses with both 
discrete and continuous measurements of the Self-Monitoring Scale and found better 
empirical evidence in treating self-monitoring as a continuous variable, evidenced 
through higher factor loadings. 
However, Gangestad and Snyder (1991) believed that Miller and Thayer's 
( 1989) analysis consisted of false psychometric premises and a general 
misunderstanding of Gangestad and Snyder's (1985) claims. According to Gangestad 
and Snyder ( 1991 ), Miller and Thayer ( 1989) implicitly proposed that if a 
continuously measured scale correlates with a dichotomous variable, then a 
dichotomized version of the measure would measure the variables better. Hence, 
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when Miller and Thayer ( 1989) found that the continuous scaled measures better fit 
the variable, they believed that self-monitoring was a continuous variable. Gangestad 
and Snyder (1989) stated that a continuously scored indicator would actually correlate 
higher with a dichotomous variable, than with a dichotomized version of the variable. 
The second concern that Briggs and Cheek ( 1988) presentis similar to past 
arguments about the specious nature of the self-monitoring construct. Basically, one 
factor of the scale, termed other-directedness (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Miell & 
Le Voi 1985) is indicative of a person who "may have a neurotic maladjustment" (p. 
674). A final concern of Briggs and Cheek (1988) lay with the general use of the 
term self-presentation, which is found within the self-monitoring individual. Briggs 
and Cheek (1988) argue that high self-monitors engage in self-presentation, while low 
self-monitors never engage in self-presentation. This contradicts Snyder's (1974) 
conception of the self-monitor in which low self-monitors do engage in self-
presentation. That is, a low self-monitor's style of self-presentation is consistent 
across situations, and is indicative of their internal states. However, Briggs and 
Cheek (1988) believe that self-presentation means something different. Self-
presentation is conceptualized as the individual communicating in ways that reflect 
themselves to others in a positive light, no matter in which situation they find 
themselves. Briggs and Cheek (1988) believe that this is something that is not 
characteristic of a low self-monitor. Thus, Erving Goffinan ( 1959) states that we are 
actors following scripts which are determined by the situation. Extending this to the 
current research paper, it is believed that high self-monitors are better adept at 
understanding and following the prescribed scripts. 
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Several parallel theoretical lines appear to lay similar support for the 
communicator reaction to the environment stimulus. First, social psychologist Kurt 
Lewin ( 1936) devised the formula B=f(P ,E) to represent the notion that behavior is a 
function of the person and the environment, interactionists have been interested in the 
relationship between personality characteristics and the situation as well as the 
resulting behaviors. Second, Erving Goffman ( 1967), a symbolic interactionist, 
developed a dramaturgical approach, building upon G.H. Mead's work. This theory 
explained communication behavior on the basis of a particular situation or "frame" 
thereby giving situation the defining influence in all interaction. Using Goffman's 
explanation: "the emphasis is placed upon how selves and identities emerge out of 
situational constraints that shape the 'performance' of the role players" (Layder, 
1981). Goffman believes that our interaction is guided by following particular rules, 
"scripts" of a situation. 
People act particular ways in different situations because they are following 
the rules and expectations of their interpretation and perception of the situation. An 
individual may perceive a situation to have certain rules because a situation resembles 
another, the rules of which they are familiar (Lord, 1982). Lord ( 1982) states, "the 
notion that behavior is a function of the situation as perceived or interpreted by the 
individual ... has been a basic premise of social psychology" (p. 1084). He, like Cody 
and McLaughlin ( 1985) developed a method of classifying situations based on 
knowledge and perceptions. This paper will not fully delve into individuals' 
perceptions, because although that is an important area of study. 
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Cross-Situational Variability 
Similarly, psychologist's theoretical concepts give validity to the focus of 
interaction responses shaping self-monitoring that has seldom been discussed by 
either critics (Briggs and Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980) or by 
supporters (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974; Snyder &Gangestad, 1988) is 
the issue of context effects. Nesler, Tedeschi and Storr (1995) describe context 
effects as a phenomenon in which responses to one personality inventory influences 
responses to other scales or behaviors measured within the same testing session. Not 
surprisingly, Nesler et al. (1995) found that when participants read instructions that 
indicated that the Self-Monitoring Scale measured one's ability to act, with females' 
scores on the scale being higher while males' scores on the scale were lower than the 
standard testing condition. In a second experiment, Nesler et al. (1995) had 
participants respond to the Self-Monitoring Scale after responding to questions about 
sexual deception. Nesler et al. (1988) found that in this case, scores on the Self-
Monitoring Scale were lower than the standard testing condition. 
Lippa (1976) found that when participants were asked to role-play either 
introverted or extraverted teachers over subsequent trials, high self-monitors were 
better able to act out the various performances better than low self-monitors, based on 
naive judge's ratings. High self-monitors' expressive behaviors changed more across 
trials to fit the requirements of the situation compared to low self-monitors (Lippa, 
1976). However, there was one facet of personality that high self-monitors had 
trouble changing across trials. Lippa (1976) found that high self-monitors were 
consistently rated by judges as being more extraverted across situations; their 
extraversion "leaked out" even when they were required to role play an anxious 
teacher. 
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Snyder and Monson (1975) examined the differences that self-monitoring has 
on an individual's sensitivity to situational cues to act in a socially appropriate 
manner, and the behavioral consistency of self-monitors. Snyder and Monson (1975) 
found that high self-monitors would reliably conform to group discussions that 
differed over time. In a second study, Snyder and Monson (1975) found that high 
self-monitors reported more situational variability than low self-monitors on the traits 
of generosity, honesty, and hostility. 
Lippa and Donaldson (1990) conducted a study assessing the cross-situational 
consistency of self-monitors' behaviors across interpersonal relationships. In this 
study, participants filled out diaries in which they indicated who they were interacting 
with, their current inhabited setting, and the behaviors that they engaged in. 
Participants filled out a computer assessment indicating people that they interacted 
with, the role or relationship with that person, behaviors that are typically engaged in, 
in these situations, and the settings typically inhabited with these people. Lippa and 
Donaldson (1990) found that the various measures were highly intercorrelated, and 
that consistency measures were negatively correlated with self-monitoring. That is, 
high self-monitors show less cross-situational consistency in relationships 
High self-monitors' tendency to be more cross-situationally variable in 
expressive behavior implies that these individuals that are more adaptable to differing 
situations. Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) examined the role of self-monitoring and 
performance in boundary spanning jobs. Boundary spanning jobs are characterized as 
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sending and receiving information both inside and outside the organization's 
boundaries. Individuals who have boundary spanning jobs must present 
organizational information to other constituencies, outside of their organization, and 
thus, create variable situation and interaction demands. This type of job brings an 
individual into contact with many different types of people and social settings, as 
varied organizations conduct business with his/her home organization. A boundary-
spanning job would probably be best performed by high self-monitors, according to 
Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982), as they can alter their self-presentations in the various 
situations that they find themselves in. Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) found that high 
self-monitors outperformed low self-monitors in boundary spanning jobs. 
Attitude/Behavior Congruence 
In an early study of attitude and subsequent behaviors of self-monitors, 
Snyder and Tanke (1975) found that low self-monitors have a higher correspondence 
between behaviors and attitudes then high self-monitors. Zanna, Olson, and Fazio 
(1980) extended the research on the attitude behavior relationship among self-
monitors and found that only low self-monitors who held previously unchanging 
views about a topic held consistent behaviors and attitudes. Further evidence by 
Paulhus (1982) showed that low self-monitors' are more apt to experience cognitive 
dissonance (a type of cognitive conflict) when they are asked to engage in behaviors 
that are against their attitudes, or that they would view with a negative valence. To 
rationalize this attitude behavior discrepancy, low self-monitors change their attitudes 
to reflect the recent behavior, and actually perceived the behavior to be more 
enjoyable. However, since high self-monitors have lower attitude/behavior 
congruence, they did not experience cognitive dissonance, or all of its subsequent 
effects. 
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Snyder and Kendzierski ( 1982) examined determinants of the correspondence 
between attitudes and behavior concerning affirmative action. Snyder and 
Kendzierski (1982) initially found that correspondence between attitudes and 
behavior was low for both low and high self-monitors. However, when increasing the 
availability of attitudes, by allowing individuals to think about their attitudes, created 
a high attitude/behavior correspondence for low self-monitors, but not for high self-
monitors. In another condition of the study, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) found 
that increasing relevance, or the importance of attitudes, created an attitude/behavior 
correspondence between low and high self-monitors. The similarity of responses 
between low and high self-monitors can probably be justified by interpreting their 
actions through different motivational biases. Relevance, or importance of decision 
possibly affected low self-monitors on an internal level. Low self-monitors may have 
taken personal responsibility for the outcome of their decision. High self-monitors 
may have interpreted the relevance information on a self-presentation level, and felt 
compelled to be socially desirable. 
Mellema and Bassili ( 1995) examined the relationship between values and 
attitudes and the possible moderating role of self-monitoring. Mellema and Bassili 
(1995) predicted that there would be a stronger relationship between the values and 
attitudes of low self-monitors compared to high self-monitors. Mellema and Bassili 
(1995) drew these predictions from the past research findings of Snyder and DeBono 
{1987), who found that attitudes for the low self-monitor were more indicative of 
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their actual values, while a high self-monitor's outward displays of attitudes were 
more based on socially appropriateness or what attitude best fits the "attitude of the 
social situation." The "attitude of the social situation" is manifested through a 
groups' decision, or through a description in a vignette. Mellema and Basilli ( 1995) 
found that values for low self-monitors were more predictive of attitudes towards 
issues. 
Attention To Differing Sources of Social Information 
Besides "attitudes'', another dimension of the situation is how the 
communicator perceives her/his partner, especially with respect to social knowledge 
about her/him. Elliot ( 1979) examined how differing levels of self-monitoring affect 
individuals' preparation for a future interaction, and the impact that presenting an 
accurate or fabricated impression has on this preparation. Elliot ( 1979) predicted that 
since high self-monitors are eager to acquire information about a target, they will 
spend more of their time trying to learn information about the target, while a low self-
monitor will let his or her internal states guide the future interaction. Elliot ( 1979) 
found that when high self-monitors planned a fabricated interaction, they "bought" 
more information about the partner, while low self-monitors relied more on internal 
information in both types of interactions. 
When we typically choose our partners for social activities, we may choose 
them based on usually one of two sets of considerations (Snyder et al., 1983). 
Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson (1983) conducted a study examining the different 
considerations that high and low self-monitors take into account when they are 
choosing with whom they want to interact. Snyder et al. ( 1983) were mainly 
concerned with the systematic differences in the nature of friends who comprise the 
social networks of low and high self-monitors. 
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One set of considerations involves choosing friends that are experts, or are 
knowledgeable about a task. These types of friends are typically chosen for a 
particular task or activity. Snyder et al. (1983) believe that high self-monitors choose 
activity partners that are specialists, making it easier for them to display their 
competence in various domains. As a result of "expert picking," high self-monitors 
should tend to have a social world, where they pick different friends for different 
situations. Conversely, low self-monitors choose activity partners that they like, or 
share similar views with, resulting in low self-monitors having a consistent set of 
friends that they interact with in various situations. Snyder et al. (1983) found that 
their predictions were true. High self-monitors preferred partitioned social worlds in 
which they used specialists for activities and low self-monitors chose friends that 
were similar to them and did all activities with them. These results show that high 
self-monitors prefer multiple friends for varying situations, while low self-monitors 
prefer friends who are similar to them and with whom they interact across various 
situations. 
Does this type of result also apply to dating relationships? These types of 
patterns also prevail in romantic relationships oflow and high self-monitors (Snyder 
& Simpson, 1984). Snyder and Simpson (1984) reported high self-monitors were 
more willing to change intimate partners for alternative partners, but low self-
monitors were unwilling. Furthermore, high self-monitors reported dating a greater 
number of partners and dating partners over a shorter period of time. There was less 
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of a link between length of relationship and level of intimacy as opposed to low self-
monitors. 
Again, Snyder, Berscheid, and Glick ( 1985) dichotomize as Snyder, 
Gangestad, and Simpson ( 1983) had done with the two sets of considerations that are 
taken into account when choosing an activity partner. However, Snyder et al. (1985) 
dichotomized the sets of consideration that individuals take when initiating dating 
relationships and serving as factors related to attraction. Snyder et al. (1985) propose 
that high self-monitors want attractive partners as it serves as a boost to their public 
appearance, while low self-monitors are more invested in internal attributes of the 
other person. Individuals either attend to physical appearance or to personality 
attributes when making relationship choices. 
These patterns of attraction, physical appearance or personality, which also 
served as indicators of initiation of relationships among low and high self-monitors 
(Snyder et al., 1985). High self-monitors held physical appearance as the most 
relevant determiner of and most relevant on whether they would chose someone for a 
date. Low self-monitors chose personality characteristics as their main determiner 
when choosing a date. Supporting Snyder et al. ( 1983 ), Jamieson, Lydon, and Zanna 
(1987) reported similar results. Initial attraction towards an individual was based on 
attitude similarity for low self-monitors, and activity preference similarity had a 
stronger influence on high self-monitors' attraction. 
Besides attending to either physical or internal characteristics of potential 
dating partners, self-monitoring also serves as a moderator for the self-attribution of 
emotions. Graziano and Bryant (1998) demonstrated that low self-monitors used the 
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self as a guide to evaluate and regulate emotions, although high self-monitors would 
look to situational cues to understand their emotions. High self-monitors believed 
that certain stimulus objects were more attractive when they heard a measure of their 
heartbeat increase, when in actuality the supposed measure of their heartbeat was 
manipulated by the experimenters. This effect did not replicate among low self-
monitors. When they heard a fake measure of their heartbeat increase when viewing 
certain objects, there was no difference in perceived attraction. Graziano and Bryant 
( 1998) also found that high self-monitors found comedy skits to be funnier when a 
laugh track was included, while low self-monitors did not report a difference in 
perceived jocularity of the comedy skits that included a laugh track. 
Other research examined the role that self-monitoring plays in individuals' 
usage of consensus information to predict future behavior in a new situation 
(Krosnick & Sedikides, 1990). Consensus information is "data regarding how most 
people would act in the situation" (p. 718). Their predictions were based on earlier 
findings by Kulik and Taylor ( 1981) who found that high self-monitors used 
consensus information more than low self-monitors. 
This previous research on consensus information typically yielded two 
findings: l )People either use the consensus information (or the base rate information 
of how most people would act); or, 2) they may use their past behaviors in similar 
situations to predict how they would act in the new situation. Krosnick and Sedikides 
(1990) predicted that certain personality characteristics, such as self-monitoring, 
potentially would moderate individuals use of consensus information, or information 
that is more idiosyncratic in nature. Krosnick and Sedikides ( 1990) predicted that 
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high self-monitors, being overly concerned with projecting a socially positive image, 
would use consensus information that is related to engaging in good deeds and 
avoiding socially undesirable actions, compared to low self-monitors. However, 
Krosnick and Sedikides (1990) were also examining the types of consensus 
information as previously indicated. Through a series of studies, Krosnick and 
Sedikides (1990) found that high self-monitors were more responsive to 
complimentary or socially desirable consensus information than low self-monitors; 
while low self-monitors were more responsive to threatening consensus information. 
In other words, high self-monitors were more likely to engage in socially desirable 
behaviors when others engaged in the socially desirable behavior; while low self-
monitors would help engage in socially desirable behavior when no one else would. 
Thus, self-monitoring is used for predicting future actions based on differing types of 
consensus information. 
Self-monitoring has been used to further understand the different social 
information processing goals of low and high self-monitors. Chen, Shechter and 
Chaiken ( 1996) discussed two different types of processing goals. One type of 
motivation in processing information is to attain accuracy, or to "be right." The 
second goal in processing is to "be friendly" or to put across a friendly, socially 
desirable image to others. Chen et al. ( 1996) also discuss these goals and their 
implications on the depth of processing. They state that accuracy-motivated goals are 
"indicative of both heuristic and systematic processing in which the individual 
processes information in a relatively impartial, open-minded manner'' (p.263) The 
researchers mention that impression-motivated goals are indicative of the "selective 
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use of heuristic processing, set at achieving the immediate social goal at hand" 
(p.263). Chen et al. (1996) predicted that high self-monitors were more likely to use 
impression-motivated processing, and low self-monitors would use more accuracy-
based processing. In their first study, Chen et al. ( 1996) discovered that high self-
monitors were more impression motivated, and tended to reflect attitudes of the same 
valence as their partner, when compared to low self-monitors. In their second study, 
Chen et al. ( 1996) found that accuracy-motivated individuals (low self-monitors) 
displayed their accuracy "bias" in both initial attitudes, reflecting heuristic processing 
and then this bias continued with later attitudes in which low self-monitors engaged 
in more systematic processing. 
Snyder and Cantor ( 1980) also examined different types of social knowledge 
that low and high self-monitors attend to in their social interactions. Based on the 
self-monitoring typology, low self-monitors tended to reflect their internal 
dispositions when interacting with others; while high self-monitors behaviors tended 
to fit in with the current social interaction. Since both have divergent styles of 
interaction, and sources of social knowledge in how to interact, it should also relate to 
their self-knowledge. Their self-knowledge reflects their social knowledge or 
behaviors and their social behaviors are indirect ways of measuring their self-
knowledge. Taking this into consideration, Snyder and Cantor ( 1980) predicted that 
low self-monitors would have a better internally based, cognitive representation of 
their characteristic selves compared to high self-monitors. On the other hand, high 
self-monitors would have more knowledge or a "richer" knowledge base of externally 
based cognitive representations of prototypes, or the typical, ideal way of acting 
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across situations. These predictions were supported when Snyder and Cantor ( 1980) 
found that low self-monitors provided more informative descriptions of their own 
characteristic selves. High self-monitors were better able to provide "richer" 
descriptions of prototypes or of individuals that had different traits. 
Low and high self-monitors show an increased attention to sources of 
information that were converse to each other. As a result, the feedback from these 
sources of information can have differing effects on low and high self-monitors' self-
esteem after self-presentation. An interesting study by Jones, Brenner, and Knight 
(1990) found that when low self-monitors were asked to play self-serving, unethical 
roles that are typically unrepresentative of self, they had an increase in self-esteem 
when audience feedback indicated that they failed to act in a convincing manner. 
Jones, Brenner, and Knight (1990) also found that high self-monitors reported a 
higher self-esteem if they received audience feedback indicating that they were 
successful in playing the same role. 
Earlier research by Ickes, Layden, and Barnes, ( 1978) examined the greater 
emphasis low self-monitors' place on self as the informational base for their self-
concept. Ickes et al. (1978) created an experimental scenario in which objective self-
awareness was either present or not present for low and high self-monitors and found 
that low self-monitors were affected more than high self-monitors in the objective 
self-awareness condition. Low self-monitors' responses shifted in the objective self-
awareness condition in that they described their self-concept as being more unique. 
However, high self-monitors showed no change across conditions. In general then, 
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results show the greater emphasis low self-monitors place on stable self as the key to 
understanding how they see themselves. 
These results indicate that it was reaffirming and self-esteem enhancing for 
low self-monitors to have difficulty acting like someone else and convincing an 
audience. High self-monitors' self-esteem was increased when they were able to 
convince a crowd of being someone different. This places the emphasis of self as 
being the main source of self-esteem for the low self-monitor, while success at 
"playing the role" was more important to the high self-monitor's self-esteem. An 
interesting modification of the self-monitoring literature was that playing the role of 
someone socially undesirable did not reduce the effect of self-esteem enhancement in 
the high self-monitor, rather successful acting for an audience was more self-esteem 
enhancing. 
High self-monitors, who develop a variable self-concept through various 
social situations, most likely did not change their description of their self-concept as 
the experimental situation did not "necessitate" a change in their socially constructed 
self-concept. However, high self-monitors do not look to the self to assess their self-
concept. The self-awareness condition creates an emphasis on the self, however high 
self-monitors do not use self for describing self-concept. 
Review of the Theoretical Integration of Self-Concept and Self-Monitoring 
This review of the self-monitoring literature brings up significant points that 
bridge self-monitoring as a possible moderator of the relationship between directional 
questions and self-concept. Referring back to Kunda et al. (1993) the investigators 
assessed how individuals perceive their variability on either extraversion or 
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introversion across situations. They determined that the perceived variability 
consequent to cueing was related to whether retrieval of thoughts in response to a 
directional question had effected a subsequent self-rating on that trait. This indicator 
seems rather similar to the aspect of variability as evidenced by the research on cross-
situational consistency, attitude/behaviors and attention to different sources of 
information in the self-monitoring literature. To establish self-monitoring as bridging 
construct before communication and perspectives, the researcher designed and 
executed two studies. 
Therefore: 
H1: It is hypothesized that high self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a 
change in self-concept between the first and second session on their self rated 
trait that was assessed with the directional question. 
H2 : High self-monitors will be more likely to exhibit a change in self-concept 
based on the quantity of thoughts generated. 
Overview of Study One 
The first study was designed to test to see the reaction of one's self-
concept after the presence of a strong directional question. The second study was 
designed to test how significantly related/ similar certain measurements between the 
disciplines of psychology and communication studies are with regards to the areas of 
self-monitoring and self-concept. Therefore, in the first study, the researcher adapted 
Kunda et al. 's ( 1993) methodology. Similar results were expected, i.e. high self-
monitors, or individuals who have a variable self-concept including either 
extraversion or introversion, will perceive themselves as possessing differing levels 
of that trait after recalling thoughts that support a directional question ("are you 
introverted?", "are you extraverted?". 
The hypothesis for Study One may be explained by two differing accounts. 
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First, high self-monitors are more situationally responsive and they will perceive 
themselves differently based on the thoughts that they recalled. In this case, the 
thought process and the research paradigm (presentation of a directional question) 
itself will serve as the situation. Second, since low self-monitors perceive themselves 
as being consistent and behaving on internal dispositions, they will disregard the 
thought process as solely being a situation that has no true bearing on how they 
perceive themselves. Furthermore, thought process (recalling and writing down 
thoughts to the proposed directional question) and the research paradigm will have no 
effect on self-concept, as evidenced through self-ratings. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 53 (21 males and 32 females) undergraduate students 
from University of Rhode Island enrolled and listed on an instructor's roster from 
either a COM 101 (Public speaking) or COM 206 (Research methods) introductory 
communication studies course. Of the 53 participants, 52 indicated their 
race/ethnicity, with 45 (86.5%) being European-American, 2 (3.8%) being Asian-
Americans, 2 (3.8%) being Hispanic-Americans, and 3 (5.8%) indicated "other" as 
their ethnicity. The age range of the participants was rather homogenous ( 18 to 25) 
with a mean of 19.7, and a standard deviation of 1.55. 
Materials 
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Participants completed two counterbalanced forms during the first session of 
the experiment and four forms in random order (with certain constraints) during the 
second session. The first session took approximately fifteen minutes. Participants 
were given a packet consisting of a title page, a personality scale and a self-rating 
form. The revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) consists of 18 
items that will be changed from a True-False format to a likert-type scale with a 1 to 
5 response format, with 1 indicating "strongly disagree", to 5 indicating "strongly 
agree". A higher score on the scale indicated having a higher degree of self-
monitoring. The revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) was 
used as it has been reported to have a a of +.70, which is higher than the internal 
consistency of the original Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). The revised scale 
was also used as it has been reported to be a more distilled measure of self-
monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). 
Another form that participants filled out was a self-rating form based on the 
Big Five construct of personality. The Big Five construct was used, as it has become 
a prominent personality structure in both personality and social psychological 
research. The Big Five include extraversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability, 
culture, and agreeableness. The self-rating form consisted of 25 items (five indicators 
for each construct of the Big Five) on a 10-point scale with a negative trait anchored 
at the left and a positive trait anchored on the right. Accordingly, higher scores 
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indicate more positive judgments of self. Some indicators were randomly reversed to 
prevent response set in participants. 
The second session of the experiment also took about fifteen minutes. 
Materials and procedures were modified from Kunda et al. ( 1993 ), in which 
participants were given packets containing various forms in a random order under 
certain constraints. One form that participants completed was a form with the 
instructions "Please list below some examples of your past behaviors, thoughts, or 
feelings that come to your mind as you try to answer this question" (p.67). Half of 
the participants were either presented with one of two questions, "Are you 
introverted?" or "Are you extraverted?". These two trait items will be used as they 
were previously replicated in Kunda et al's work (1993). In addition, past research on 
the impact of extraversion on communication has been very strong. One result has 
been that extroverts talk more then introverts (Goss, 1989). To apply this, we assume 
that there will be a subsequent effect in the quantity of words used in descriptions to 
answer the two proposed questions. On another form they completed a self-rating 
form consisting of the Big Five, the same as the self-rating form in the first session. 
The third form that participants filled out was assessing how variable they see 
themselves on the particular trait on a scale from 1 to 10. On the fourth form, 
demographic information was measured by asking open-ended questions assessing 
gender, age, and race/ethnicity. 
These four forms were placed in random order with one constraint. The 
stimulus form (ie "Are you introverted/extraverted?") always came before the self-
rating form. This constraint on random order was impinged for two reasons. First, 
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the causal variable always preceded the dependent variable, allowing the researchers 
to make a stronger claim for causation. Second, because instructors and professors 
were unwilling (after initial assent) to allow data collection, the researcher did not 
have enough participants to allocate for another independent variable assessing 
changes in self-rating in the second session before receiving the directional question 
and after receiving the question. The self-rating form and the Revised Self-
Monitoring Scale (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986) were counterbalanced to prevent 
presentation effects. 
Procedure 
Overview. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, each session 
taking approximately fifteen minutes. In the first session, the experimenters indicated 
the purpose of the experiment, the requirements of the study, and that participants 
will complete the informed consent document, a self-monitoring scale and a self-
rating. Experimenters told the participants that the second session would consist of 
answering questions and then completing a self-rating, a measure of variability and 
demographic information. There was at least a one-week lag time between sessions 
so that participants were less likely to remember their self-ratings in the first session. 
First Session. In the first session, an experimenter came to the class, 
introduced herself and told participants that they are conducting an experiment that 
will be assessing the interaction of personality and situational factors regarding 
interpersonal interactions. The experimenters indicated that the study would be 
conducted over two sessions. The experimenters mentioned that for the first session 
of the study, participants would fill out various scales. For the second session of the 
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experiment, the experimenters indicated to the participants that they will be asked a 
few questions and then they will fill out various forms. Possible participants were 
notified that they can withdraw at any time and will not be penalized for sole 
completion of the first stage. The class was told that anyone who does not want to 
participate can leave with their professor and he/she will have an alternative exercise 
provided for them. Both failure to participate (or participation) did not affect the 
student's grade in any way. 
After covering the guidelines of the study, the researchers then indicated that 
anyone who would like to participate in the study should raise her/his hand, and an 
informed consent document was distributed to those individuals. Those participants 
willing to be a part of the study were handed a packet to complete. The packet 
consisted of a title page, the Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder and Gangestad, 
1986), and a self-rating form. Participants were then instructed to proceed through the 
packet until they were finished. 
After the participants have completed the packet, the participants submitted 
their forms to the experimenter. The participants were then instructed to write a word 
and one number that they could easily recall as a password for both the first and 
second sessions on their data packets. This word and number were used as a means to 
track and match participants across sessions, and to keep them anonymous; not for 
any other means. This step was taken to insure both anonymity and confidentiality 
for the participants. 
Second Session. Experimenters returned to the class after one week, or after 
19 days had expired. Upon entrance, the experimenters reminded the participants that 
41 
they were here to proceed with the second session of the experiment. The researchers 
then reiterated that the participants who previously agreed to participate in the second 
session should raise their hands and the experimenter gave them the packet. 
The packet that participants filled out consisted of five pages. The packet 
consisted of a title page, a page with a question asking participants to indicate the 
thoughts or feelings that they think of when answering whether they are (a) 
introverted or (b) extraverted. The next page of the packet consisted of a 25-item 
self-rating scale followed by a page assessing the participant's perceived variability 




Self-monitoring was relatively equal across gender and ethnicity. An 
independent-samples t-test revealed that there was no significant gender difference in 
relation to self-monitoring t50 = .503, p = .617; with means and SDs of 55.81 and 7 .51 
for males, and 54.71 and 7.88 for females. A one-way AN OVA revealed a lack of a 
significant ethnicity effect for self-monitoring F3, 47 = .169, p = .917. The means and 
SDs for ethnic groups were 55.09 and 8.15 for European-Americans, 55.5 and 3.54 
for Asians-Americans, and 53.00 and 4.24 for Hispanics. However, these results 
should be viewed as tentative since the sample was 86.5 percent European-American. 
Extraversion. 
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Extraversion had the same pattern of results as self-monitoring regarding 
gender and ethnicity. Self-rated extraversion was relatively similar for males and 
females, t(49) = -.731, p = .468, two-tailed. Means and SDs were 5.5 and 1.73 for 
males and 5.97 and 2.50 for females. Across ethnicity, a one-way ANOV A revealed 
no significant effects, F(J,46) = .755, p = .525. The means and SDs based on ethnic 
groups were 5.93 and 2.27 for European-Americans, 3.50 and .71 for Asians-
Americans, and 6.00 and 1.41 for Hispanics. Highly unequal Ns for ethnic groups 
was also a concern regarding this analysis. 
Diagnostics/Manipulation Checks 
Kunda et al's (1993) measure of variability was correlated with self-
monitoring, to assess whether this initial predictor and self-monitoring tap the same 
construct. There was no significant relationship between self-monitoring and self-
reported variability of introversion/extraversion, r = -.068, n = 45, p = .659. 
Since the forms were counterbalanced in the first session, an independent 
samples t-test was conducted to determine whether there was an order effect on 
responses to forms. Ratings of extraversion and self-monitoring scores were analyzed 
for differences depending on the order of presentation. Presenting the self-monitoring 
scale and then the self-rating scale resulted in means and SDs of 5.68 and 2.56 for 
self-rated extraversion (n =25); 54.00 and 8.22 for self-monitoring (n = 24) vs. 
presenting the self-rating form and then the self-monitoring scale with means and sd's 
of 5.89 and 1.88 for extraversion (n = 26), and 56.15 and 7.18 for self-monitoring (n 
= 28). There was no significant difference between extraversion and self-monitoring 
based on order of presentation, t(49) = -.326, p = .746, and t(50) = -1.003, p = .321 
both two-tailed, respectively. 
Change in Self Ratings 
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A 2x2x2x2 mixed-model ANOV A (Study 1, Table 1 ), consisting of one 
within-subjects variable and three between-subjects variables, was used to analyze 
under what conditions; personal characteristics, contextual conditions, and the 
interaction of personal characteristics with contextual conditions affect change in self-
concept. The within-subjects variable, change in extraversion, consisted of two 
levels; pre and post directional question rating of extraversion. One between-subjects 
variable was level of self-monitoring, as either low or high based on scores on the 
self-monitoring scale. Participants who scored less than or equal to the theoretical 
median of 54 were coded as low self-monitors, while those who scored 55 and above 
were coded as high self-monitors. 
Another independent variable was the type of question (either 
introverted/extraverted) that participants were asked. A third between-subjects 
variable was congruence/incongruence of question with self-rated extraversion. A 
discussion of coding for the third between-subjects variable is in order. First, the 
participants were coded as either introverted or extraverted based on self-ratings in 
the first session. A rating of 1 through 5 indicated self-rated introversion and 6 
through 10 indicated self-rated extraversion. This information was then compared to 
the type of question that they were asked. Congruency of question occurred when 
participants' self-rating matched the type of question that they were asked. 
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There was no significant change in extraversion, F( 1,42) = 1.468, p = .232, 
from time l to time 2. Type of question did not have a significant main effect on 
change in extraversion, F(l ,42) = .050, p = .825. Congruency of directional question 
with an individual ' s self-rating did not have a significant main effect on change in 
extraversion, F( 1,42) = 1.028, p = .317. However, there was a significant main effect 
for self-monitoring on change in extraversion, F(l ,42) = 5.992, p = .019. Means for 
extraversion for low self-monitors decreased from session l to session 2, from 5.367 
and 4.133; and means increased for high self-monitors from 5.619 to 6.036. There 
was also a two-way interaction between type of question and congruence on change 
in extraversion, F(l,42) = 12.154, p = .001. Participants given a congruent 
extraverted question exhibited a decrease in extraversion, from 7.50 to 6.33; 
participants given an incongruent extraverted question exhibited an increase in 
extraversion from 4.167 to 4.667. Participants that were given a congruent 
introverted question, rated themselves higher on extraversion, from 3.567 to 4.6; 
while participants who were given an introverted question that was not congruent, 
rated themselves more introverted, from 6.738 to 4.738. 
There were no significant two-way interactions between type of question and 
self-monitoring or congruence of question and self-monitoring, F(l ,42) = .001, p = 
.98, and F(l ,42) = .050, p = .825. There was no significant three way interaction 
between type of question, congruence of question, and self-monitoring on change in 
extraversion, F( 1,42) = .587, p = .448. 
Listed Thoughts 
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Two raters coded thoughts in response to the directional question asked during 
the second session. The raters were two undergraduate students, who were trained by 
the researcher to code the listed thoughts into various fixed categories. Thoughts 
were either coded as supporting the question, refuting the question, irrelevant to the 
question, and total thoughts overall. Inter-rater reliability was sufficiently high, 
Cronbach's a's of .93, .97, .89, and .95 for agreeing, disagreeing, irrelevant, and 
total thoughts, respectively. The results confirmed that the raters were judging coded 
responses reliably with each other. 
There were no significant gender differences on any of the types of thoughts 
listed; t(sI) = .223, p = .824; t(5I) = .901, p = .372; t(sI) = .741, p = .462; and t(sI) = 
1.09, p =.281(all two-tailed) for agreeing, disagreeing, irrelevant and total thoughts 
between males and females. Means and sd's for males' reported thoughts were 1.47 
and 1.57, .86 and 1.35, .333 and 1.11 and 2.67 and 2.01 on agreeing, disagreeing, 
irrelevant and total thoughts in response to a directional question .. Females thoughts 
were means and SDs of 1.38 and 1.64, .53 and 1.24, .15 and .63, and 2.06 and 1.95. 
Also, at-test revealed no significant difference between high and low self-monitors 
on types of thoughts, t(so) = -1.224, p = .227; 1(so) = .77, p = .441; t(sO) = 1.132, p = 
.263; t(so)= .011, p = .991 for agreeing, disagreeing, other, and total thoughts. 
However, correlations showed some significant relationships between self-monitoring 
and types of thoughts listed. There was a significant relationship between self-
monitoring and agreeing thoughts, r = .251, n =50, p = .040; and total thoughts, r = 
.251, n = 50, p = .039, both one-tailed, when self-monitoring was not median split 
into two groups, which is necessary for at-test. 
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Means and SDs for agreeing thoughts across racial groups were 1.42 and 1.53 
for European-Americans, 0 and 0 for Asian-Americans, 2.83 and 2.00 for Hispanics. 
Means and sd's for disagreeing thoughts were .67 and 1.35 for European-Americans, 
1 and 1.41 for Asian-Americans, 0 and 0 for Hispanics. Means and SDs for other or 
irrelevant thoughts were .09 and .35 for European-Americans, 2.5 and 3.54 for Asian-
Americans, 1.5 and 2.12 for Hispanics. Means for sd's for total thoughts were 2.18 
and 1.87 for European-Americans, 3.5 and 2.12 for Asian-Americans, 3.5 and 4.95 
for Hispanics. 
A 2x2x2 ANOV A (Study 2, Table 2), (type of question, self-monitoring, and 
congruence) similar to the previous ANOVA, was created to examine the differences 
in cognitive processes (i.e. listed thoughts) of participants when responding to 
directional questions under certain conditions. Type of question did not have a 
significant main effect on any of the four types of thoughts; F's (1,42) of 1.618, .005, 
.241, and .771, p's > .05. As previously stated, at-test revealed no significant 
difference between any of the four thoughts in regards to self-monitoring alone. 
Therefore, there was no difference in the ANOV A procedure, which makes reporting 
the analysis redundant. Congruence of question elicited no main effects on any of the 
four types of thoughts, F's (1,42) of 1.053, .470, .061, and .270, p's > .05. 
There was a marginally significant interaction between type of question and 
self-monitoring on disagreeing thoughts, F(l ,42) = 3.283, p = .07. Low self-monitors 
generated an average of 1.33 disagreeing thoughts compared to high self-monitors 
who generated .411 disagreeing thoughts when asked an extraverted question. Low 
self-monitors generated an average of .567 disagreeing thoughts when asked the 
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introverted question, compared to high self-monitors who generated an average of 
1.119 disagreeing thoughts. For the other types of thoughts, there was no interaction 
between type of question and self-monitoring, F's (1,42) of .002, .365, 2.393, p's > 
.05. There was a significant interaction between type of question and congruence, 
F(l ,42) = 6.783, p = .013, for disagreeing thoughts, and for total thoughts, F(l ,42) = 
6.790, p = .013. 
Extraverted individuals generated an average of .202 disagreeing thoughts 
when they were presented with an extraverted question. Introverted individuals 
generated an average of 1.542 disagreeing thoughts when they were asked if they 
were extraverted. Introverted individuals asked if they were introverted generated an 
average of 1.233 disagreeing thoughts, while extraverted individuals generated an 
average of .452 disagreeing statements when presented with an introverted question. 
Regarding total thoughts, extraverted individuals given an extraverted question 
generated an average of 1.988 total thoughts, while introverted individuals given an 
extraverted question generated an average of 3.250 total thoughts. Introverted 
individuals given an introverted question generated an average of 3.033 total thoughts 
while extraverted individuals given an introverted question generated an average of 
1.143 total thoughts. There was no interaction between type of question and 
congruence for agreeing thoughts and other thoughts, F( 1,42) = .047, p = .829; 
F(l,42) = 1.914, p = .174, respectively. 
There was a significant interaction between self-monitoring and congruence 
on total thoughts listed, F(l,42) = 5.728, p = .021. Low self-monitors generated an 
average of 1.867 total thoughts when presented with a question that matched their 
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self-concept, while high self-monitors generated an average of 3.155 total thoughts 
when asked a question that matched their self-concept. Low self-monitors asked a 
question that did not match their initial self concept generated an average of 3.00 total 
thoughts, while high self-monitors who were asked a question that did not match their 
initial self-concept generated an average of 1.393 total thoughts. No significant two-
way interaction between self-monitoring and congruence on agreeing thoughts, 
F( 1,42) = 2.831, p = .10. Low self-monitors that were presented with a question that 
matched their self-concept generated an average of 1.00 agreeing thoughts, while 
high self-monitors presented with a question that matched their self-concept 
generated an average of 2.036 agreeing thoughts. Low self-monitors presented with a 
question that did not match their self-concept generated an average of 1.33 agreeing 
thoughts, while high self-monitors presented with a question that did not match their 
self-concept generated an average of .661 agreeing thoughts. There was no 
significant interaction between self-monitoring and congruence on disagreeing or 
other thoughts, F(l,42) = 1.434, p = .238; F(l,42) = .130, p = .720. There was no 
three-way interaction between type of question, self-monitoring, and congruence on 
any of the four types of thoughts. F's (1,42) = 1.20, .181, .601, 2.504, p's > .05. 
Mediation. (Table 3) A difference variable was computed which measured 
the change in extraversion in session one and in session two. These analyses 
provided insight into what specifically is related to change in extraversion. First, self-
monitoring, congruence and type of question presented were loaded as predictor 
variables with extraversion change as the criterion variable in a forced entry multiple 
regression. B. weights were produced were .265, -.195, and -.086 for self-monitoring, 
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congruence, and type of question respectively. Self-monitoring had a marginally 
significant effect on change t( 49) = 1.855, p = .070. Congruence was not an adequate 
predictor of change, t( 49) = -1.394, p = .170. Type of question was also not an 
adequate predictor of change, t( 49) = -.603, p = .550. 
However, correlation showed that there was a significant relationship between 
self-monitoring and change in extraversion, (Study 1, Table 3): r = .252, n = 50, p = 
.038, one-tailed. This datum indicate that the degree of self-monitoring is related to 
the type of change in extraversion ratings in the second session. Regarding types of 
thoughts, the number of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts were related to 
change in extraversion: r = .30, n = 50, p = .017; r = .369, n = 50, p = .004, 
respectively both one-tailed. There was no significant relationship between the 
number of agreeing thoughts and change in extraversion, and other thoughts and 
change in extraversion, r = .17 4, n = 50, p = .114; r = .065, n = 50, p = .328, 
respectively both one-tailed. 
There was a significant relationship between the number of disagreeing 
thoughts, total thoughts and change in extraversion: r = .519, n = 27, p = .003; r = 
.358, n = 27, p = .034 when the participants were presented with the introverted 
question. When participants were presented with the extraverted question, there was 
a significant relationship between the number of agreeing thoughts, total thoughts and 
change in extraversion, r = .484, n = 24, p = .009; r = .414, n = 24, p = .022. 
Regarding self-monitoring, there was a marginally significant relationship of 
r = .378, n = 19, p = .055 between the number of other thoughts and change in 
extraversion for low self-monitors when presented with either type of question. 
There was a significant relationship between number of disagreeing thoughts and 
change in extraversion, r = .522, n = 31, p = .002, when high self-monitors were 
presented with either type of question. There was also a significant relationship 
among high self-monitors between the number of total thoughts and change in 
extraversion, r = .417, n = 31, p = .009. 
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Regarding congruence of question with initial self-concept change in 
extraversion and the number of disagreeing thoughts, which correlated significantly at 
r = .376, n= 33, p = .015, (one-tailed) when participants were presented with 
congruent questions. When presented with congruent questions, there was also a 
significant correlation between change in extraversion and number of total thoughts, r 
= .427, n = 33, .007, (one-tailed). There was no significant relationship between 
change in extraversion and the number of any type of thoughts when the question was 
incongruent with initial self-concept. 
DISCUSSION 
The present findings suggest that changes in extraversion occur only under 
certain conditions and when certain personality characteristics are present. Kunda et 
al's (1993) mediating variables (thoughts) are only used (explicitly through writing) 
in certain conditions or combinations of conditions. Sometimes these thoughts 
influence change in self-concept, and then sometimes it is only certain types of 
thoughts that have an influence on change in the self-concept. 
Overall, there was no significant change in extraversion from session 1 to 
session 2 (5.78 to 5.68). However, this does not take into account the various 
moderators that may have increased or decreased extraversion, resulting in scores 
"washing out" variables that may influence extraversion by decreasing it and other 
variables acting to increase it, would negate each other out when this data is 
aggregated. 
Malleability of Self Concept 
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Of the three main variables used, self-monitoring was the only construct that 
had a significant main effect on change in extraversion, with low self-monitors rating 
themselves more introverted, and high self-monitors rating themselves more 
extraverted in the second session. A tentative interpretation of this result is that 
indeed each group's (low and high self-monitors') self-concept are malleable, but the 
change that occurs is self-verifying. Low self-monitors had a lower mean self-rating 
of extraversion (5.36), displayed a lower extraversion rating (4.13); high self-
monitors had a higher mean self-rating of extraversion (5.619), which increased 
during the second session to 6.036. 
Malleability of self-concept does occur in both groups, but it occurs in a 
direction that reinforces who they already are. This advocates that "change" is 
actually fortifying the group's initial self-concept, similar to the argument that Swann 
and Read (1980) advocate. This was a surprising result as it was intuitively believed 
that low self-monitors would be less likely to change their self-concept at all based on 
situational constraints, while high self-monitors would have more self-concept change 
potential, either increasing or decreasing their self-rated level of extraversion based 
on the situation at hand, as high self-monitors' self-concept is based on prototypical 
situations, rather than stable attributes that low self-monitors use to describe their 
characteristic self (Snyder & Cantor, 1980). 
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When a participant was asked a directional question congruent or incongruent 
with her/his initial self-concept, there was an interaction. However, interaction 
occurred in an unexpected way. When an extraverted person was asked if they were 
extraverted, they rated themselves more introverted, and an introverted person rated 
self more extraverted. Introverted individuals asked if they were introverted rated 
themselves more extraverted. Extraverted people asked if they were introverted rated 
themselves more introverted. These results are unexpected. 
The types of thoughts that were produced in this two-way interaction may 
provide some insight into these unusual results. Extraverted individuals used less 
disagreeing thoughts (mean of .202) with a congruent question, introverted 
individuals used more disagreeing thoughts (mean of 1.542) with an incongruent 
question. Introverted individuals used more disagreeing thoughts to a congruent 
question (mean of 1.233), while extraverted individuals generated less (average of 
.452) disagreeing statements when presented with an incongruent question. 
Taking these results as a whole it seems that social desirability may play a part 
in explaining these findings. When introverted individuals are asked if they are 
introverted or extraverted, they used disagreeing thoughts to guide their judgment. 
Since introversion is not as socially desirable as extraversion, introverts when asked if 
they are introverted might say something like "I am ... , but I do like to do this ..... ", 
using a more defensive style when answering the congruent question. Therefore, they 
retrieve thoughts that support the question because they are able to accept who they 
are and retrieve thoughts that do not support the question as they are trying to 
maintain that they are not total introverted "geeks" and promote their self-esteem 
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though listing socially desirable behaviors or traits. This is further supported by the 
amount of total thoughts (3.25 for incongruent question, 3.033 for congruent 
question) introverted individuals used compared to extraverted individuals ( 1.988 
congruent, 1.143 incongruent). In either case, they rate self as higher on extraversion, 
as dissonance may have been created in which their introversion was made salient 
through either their the question presented or the thoughts that they retrieved, 
resulting in them rating themselves higher on extraversion. 
Extraverts used a less active approach towards congruent and incongruent 
questions. When asked if they were introverted, many extraverted participants simply 
wrote "no" and did not bother to think about any possibilities when answering the 
question. They seemed to be less actively processing the information. Further 
evidence to support this is that they rated themselves as more introverted, perhaps 
being biased by the presented question, and less by cognitive processes. However, 
extraverted participants presented with a congruent question may have exhibited a 
decrease in extraversion due to chance, as they displayed very little disagreeing 
thoughts. 
Regarding thoughts listed, there was a two-way interaction between self-
monitoring and congruence of question. High self-monitors generated more total 
thoughts when they were presented with a congruent question compared to low self-
monitors. Low self-monitors generated more total thoughts than high self-monitors 
when presented with an incongruent question. This could mean that the type of 
situations in which low and high self-monitors find themselves elicit different 
cognitive strategies. Low self-monitors engage in more processing when they are in a 
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situation that disputes their self-concept, while high self-monitors engage in more 
processing or active thinking when they are in situations that support their self-
concept. This makes sense, because when the low self-monitor is in a situation that is 
supportive of self there is no need to monitor the attributes of the self. Conversely, in 
disparate situations they need to maintain a sense of who they are. High self-
monitors withdraw from situations incongruent with their self-concept, and become 
more cognitively active when they are in situations that support their self-concept. 
Influences on Extraversion Change 
Several predictors and mediators are related to change in extraversion. 
Overall, self-monitoring was the only marginally significant predictor (p = .07) of 
change in extraversion, but congruence and type of question were not significant. 
According to Kunda et al ( 1993 ), retrieval of thoughts in support of the question are 
mediators that influence ratings of self-concept. However, it seems that the number 
of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts were related to a change in extraversion. 
When participants were presented with the introverted question, there was a 
significant positive relationship between disagreeing thoughts, total thoughts and 
change in extraversion. This study supports Kunda et al. (1993). When participants 
were presented with the extraverted question, there was a positive relationship 
between agreeing thoughts and change in extraversion. 
Regarding self-monitoring and congruence, there was a significant positive 
correlation between other thoughts listed and change in extraversion for low self-
monitors. It was interesting that low self-monitors' change in extraversion was not 
significantly related to agreeing or disagreeing thoughts, perhaps providing support 
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that low self-monitors are less malleable in self-concept than high self-monitors when 
retrieving agreeing and disagreeing thoughts to a directional question. For high self-
monitors, there was a positive relationship between disagreeing thoughts listed, total 
thoughts and change in extraversion. This relationship implicates that the process of 
disagreeing for high self-monitors has more influence on change in extraversion. 
Interestingly, there was a significant positive correlation between change in 
extraversion and number of disagreeing thoughts and total thoughts in response to a 
congruent question, and there was no relationship between types of thoughts retrieved 
and change in extraversion when being presented with an incongruent question. 
Limitations 
Even though these are interesting results, we need to view this empirical 
inquiry as tentative in nature. One limitation of this study was choosing introversion 
and extraversion as the directional questions. Introversion tends to be viewed as 
socially undesirable compared to extraversion. This social desirability was 
implicated as why introverted individuals rated themselves higher on extraversion in 
the second session, and could also explain extraverted individuals' withdrawal 
response to incongruent questions. Another issue with the use of introversion and 
extraversion is that they are similarly related to low and high self-monitors. There 
may be a possible confound between extraversion and high self-monitors that needs 
to be addressed statistically. However, it was decided that introversion and 
extraversion should be used, since they were used in Kunda et al' s (1993) study and 
introversion/extraversion are probably the most salient way to categorize people. But 
this salience also carries with it controversy. 
Another limitation, purely statistical, is that the sample size was not large 
enough to compute a 2x2x2x2 (with one within-subjects variable) ANOV A without 
producing some biased results. It would have been optimal to have at least 80 
participants to complete the analyses. This problem will be fixed in the future, by 
including more participants. 
Implications for Future Research 
Some areas that could be addressed in the future are whether these effects 
replicate when the traits are switched from introversion/extraversion to something 
less controversial. Perhaps hardworking or something related to conscientiousness 
could be used. However, different traits may not evoke any type of thinking of 
whether it pertains to the individual, as it may be innocuous and not pique the 
attention of the participants. 
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Another area that could be examined is whether directional questions and 
retrieved thoughts translate into actual behavior in a group setting or in a dyad. If 
participants are asked if they are extraverted, do they act more extraverted when they 
are conversing with others in a group? Also, the different social cognitive 
mechanisms of low and high self-monitors need to be examined, as there seems to be 
a general lack of research on how each group attends differently to information and 
makes decisions. 
Overview of Study 2 
The initial analysis in Study 1 piqued the development of a model of self-
concept that seeks to align two diverging perspectives of self-concept development 
(see Figure 1). In communication research, the self-concept is theorized to develop 
through communication acts while in psychology, self-concept is believed to be 
derived from appraisal of behaviors or perceived personality traits. Therefore, each 
discipline has a different focus of what "material" accounts for the development of 
the self-concept. 
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To solve this interdisciplinary schism, and to try to initiate an interdisciplinary 
approach to understanding self-concept, this researcher proposes that self-monitoring 
influences both the development of personality traits and communication acts (see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2). In tum, these personality traits and communication acts 
directly and indirectly influence each other, which help shape the self-concept. 
Among various communication and psychology constructs, the author believes that 
self-monitoring is the most amenable to mediating the influence of both 
communication and psychological aspects of the developing self-concept. This is 
because self-monitoring is a construct that is based on both psychological and 
communication aspects of interacting with others. With this in mind, two analyses 
were conducted to try to test the assumption of this model regarding self-concept, 
psychological communication perspectives of self-concept development and the role 
of self-monitoring. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that communication and psychological measures 
of similar constructs (such as semantic differential extroversion and Big Five 
extraversion) will be highly correlated. Results supporting this hypothesis would 
indicate that the self-concept is comprised of direct appraisals of internal dispositions, 
or personality traits. 
H1: The psychology construct of self-monitoring will be directly related to the 
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psychological construct of the Big Five Measure of Personality. 




H 1 A iii: Conscientiousness 
H1Aiv: Emotional Stability 
H1Av: Culture/Intelligence 
Results supporting Hypothesis Two - Six would also indicate that the self-
concept is comprised also of direct appraisals of communication acts. 
H2: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of extroversion and 
communication measures will be directly related. 
H2A: Communicator Style subscales of Dramatic, Dominant, and 
Animated will correlate positively with Extraversion. 
H28: Affinity Seeking subscale of Strategic Performance will correlate 
positively with Extroversion. 
H2c: Communication Adaptability subscale of Social Confirmation and 
Social Experience will correlate positively with Extraversion. 
H20: Semantic Differential subscale of Sociability and Extroversion will 
correlate positively with Extroversion. 
H2E: Interaction Involvement subscale of Responsiveness will correlate 
positively with Extroversion. 
H3: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of agreeableness and 
communication measures will be directly related. 
H3A: Communicator Style subscales of Friendly and Contentious will 
correlate positively with Agreeableness. 
H38: Affinity Seeking subscale of Affinity Seeking Competence will 
correlate positively with Agreeableness. 
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H4 : The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Conscientiousness and 
communication measures will be directly related. 
H4A: Communicator Adaptability subscale of Articulation will correlate 
positively with Conscientiousness. 
H48 : Communicator Style subscale of Precise will correlate positively 
with Conscientiousness. 
H5: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Emotional Stability 
and communication measures will be directly related. 
H5A: Communicator Style subscale of Relaxed will correlate positively 
with Emotional Stability. 
H58: Semantic Differential subscale of Composure will correlate 
positively with Emotional Stability. 
H5c: Communicator Adaptability subscale of Social Composure will 
correlate positively with Emotional Stability. 
H6: The psychology measure of the Big Five factor of Culture and 
communication measures will be directly related. 
H6A: Communicator Style subscale of Open will correlate positively with 
Culture. 
H68: Semantic Differential subscales of Character and Competence will 
correlate positively with Culture. 
H6c: Interaction Involvement subscale of Perceptiveness will correlate 
positively with Culture. 
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As shown in preceding discussion, limited evidence indicates that self-monitoring 
appears to be comprised of both communication and psychology aspects. However, 
extant literature connects self-monitoring and psychology, or self-monitoring and 
communication, but is relatively unsuccessful in liking these two aspects. If this true, 
then both types of processes influence the self-concept, indicating that both 
perspectives of the development of the self-concept are theoretically valid. It is also 
hypothesized that self-monitoring is both a psychological measure and 
communication measure of self-concept and comprised of both communication and 
psychological aspects. 
H7: Self-monitoring will have a correlation of equal magnitude with both the 
Big Five measure of personality and all of the subscales comprising the 
following communication measures: Affinity Seeking, Communication 
Adaptability, Communicator Style, Interaction Involvement, and Semantic 
Differential. 
Self-monitoring will be directly related with communication measures, and 
the Big Five is more then adequate of a measure of self-concept because of the high 
interdependence of psychology and communication measures. As a result of the 
success of the Big Five, it will be used as the representative indicator for 
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operationalization of the self-concept. While effects will occur when self-monitoring 
is examined by both psychology and communication measures, there will be a 
stronger effect when measures are employed from both disciplines. 
H8: Psychology and communication measures combined will explain greater 
variance of self-monitoring than will psychology or communication measures 
administered independent of each other. 
This hypothesis will be supported if there are significant correlations of 
similar magnitude with both psychological and communication measures of self-
concept. Finally, self-concept, as measured by the Big Five, will change based on 




Participants from the initial sample consisted of 280 University of Rhode 
Island undergraduate students from a variety of undergraduate Communication 
Studies courses recruited during the Spring 2003 semester. Of the participants who 
provided ethnicity information, 92 percent were Caucasian, 2.5 percent Asian, 2.1 
percent African-American, 3.4 percent other. Ages of the participants ranged from 
18-37 years with a mean age of 19.95 and a standard deviation of 1.83. Participation 
was entirely voluntary and students did not receive any type of incentive for 
completion of the study. 
Procedures and Material 
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Participants primarily filled out various psychological surveys and 
communication-based surveys. Psychological forms consisted of the Revised Self-
Monitoring scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) measures that were similar to the first 
study which assessed whether the participant perceived him or herself as introverted 
or extraverted, their thoughts that supported or refuted this question, how variable 
they were on the personality trait in question, and a self-rating that measured the Big 
Five. The self-monitoring scale and the Big Five self-rating were the only 
psychological measures that will be examined in these studies, and the other measures 
will be used in future studies. Consequentially, the self-rating form was assessed 
over 2 time periods. 
Participants also filled out communication forms that consisted of a measure 
of Affinity-Seeking Instrument (Bell, Tremblay, Buerkel-Rothfuss, 1987); 
Communication Adaptability (Duran, 1983); Communication Style (Norton, 1983); 
Interaction Involvement (Cegala, 1981 ); and a 15-item Semantic Differential Scale 
(Mccroskey, Hamilton, Weiner, 1974). The Affinity-Seeking Instrument, ASI, (Bell 
et al., 1987) measures to what extent an individual is able to get others to like him or 
her. It consists of 13 items scored on a seven point Likert-type scale, ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. The ASI consist of two factors: !)Affinity 
Seeking Competence, which measures the ability to say what is necessary to be seen 
as interpersonally attractive; and 2) Strategic Performance, which measures the 
ability to play roles in order to be liked. The ASI has both acceptable reliability 
(ASC alpha of .80 to .87 and SP alpha of .83) and validity (Bell et al., 1987). 
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Communication Adaptability (Duran, 1983) consists of the ability to adapt 
one's interaction goals and behaviors to match what is expected in an interaction. It 
consists of 30 5-point Likert scale items, with responses that range from "always true 
of me" to "never true of me". The scale consists of six subscales: 1) social 
composure, or feeling relaxed in social situations; 2) social experience, or enjoying 
and participating socially; 3) social confirmation, or maintaining the other's social 
image; 4) appropriate disclosure, which is adapting one's disclosures to another's 
intimacy level; 5) articulation, the use of appropriate syntax and grammar; and wit, 
using humor to diffuse social tension. Reliability of the subscales is in the . 70s and 
.80s (Duran, 1992) and concurrent validity is strong (Duran, 1983). 
The Communicator Style Measure (Norton, 1978) examines communicator 
style, or the way that one interacts to signal how literal meaning should be taken. The 
measure consists of 51 items on a five point Likert scale that ranges from "NO!" to 
"YES!". It consists of 11 different types of communicator style, including friendly, 
impression leaving, relaxed, contentious, attentive, precise, animated, precise, 
animated, dramatic, open, dominant, and communicator image. Reliability ranges 
from .37 for friendly to .82 for dominant (Norton, 1978). The CSM has shown both 
content validity and criterion-validity (Norton, 1983). 
The Interaction Involvement Scale (Cegala, 1981) measures the degree to 
which people are engaged in their conversations with others. The measure consists of 
18 items scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from "not at all 
like me" to "very much like me". The measure consists of three subscales, including 
perceptiveness, attentiveness, and responsiveness. Perceptiveness measures being 
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aware of message meanings, attentiveness means hearing and observing, and 
responsiveness relates to a person's certainty about how to respond to others during a 
conversation. Reliability ranges from .86 for responsiveness to .90 for the overall 
scale. Concurrent validity for the measure is rather strong (Cegala, 1981 ). 
The 15-Item Semantic Differential (Mccroskey, Hamilton, Weiner, 1974) 
consists of 15 items that measure five dimensions of perceived speaker credibility. 
These dimensions include sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, and 
character. Mccroskey et al. (1974) report that the scales have adequate reliability and 
validity. Participants in the current study answered these questions in self-report 
format, describing how they perceive themselves on these traits. 
Demographics and general characteristics of the participants were assessed, 
including such things as gender, ethnicity, and age. The procedure was relatively 
straight forward, there were two sets of forms, either psychological or 
communication-based, that were presented in a counterbalanced order so that 
participants received one set (psychology or communication-based forms) in the first 
session and the second set (psychology or communication-based forms) in the second 
session. This procedure created two groups, one group that received communication 
measures in the first session and then psychological measures in the second session, 
and another group that received psychological measures in the first session and then 
communication-based measures in the second session. 
Analyses 
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Overall, there were seven different measures of psychological and 
communication self-concept were assessed in the study. One measure, the 
psychological self-rating of the Big Five was distributed twice, raising the total to 8 
different measures. Within these measures, there were a variety of subscales that 
were used for analysis. One exception was the Revised Self-Monitoring Scale, in 
which it has been argued that the scale should not be divided into the subscales that 
other researchers have developed through factor-analytic methods. The challenge is 
raised because as this has not been the original conception of the construct, and the 
scale as a whole has produced significant intrinsic validity (Snyder & Gangestad, 
1986). Accounting for all measures and subscales, 38 different subscales were 
available for analyses. 
The 27 communication scales and subscales (Affinity Seeking has 2 
subscales, Communication Adaptability has 6 subscales, Communicator Style had 11 
subscales, Interaction Involvement had 3 subscales, and Source Credibility 15-item 
Semantic Differential had 5 subscales) were examined for content emphasis and then 
categorized into one of the Big Five domains when applicable. One subscale of 
Communication Style, communicator image, was dropped from the first analysis as it 
is theorized to be used as a dependent variable (Norton, 1978), and this author did not 
think that it would be useful for this analysis. These communication subscales were 
then correlated with their measure of the Big Five and the other communication 
measures within each category to examine the magnitude of the relationships between 
communication measures and psychological measures of similar constructs. For 
example, Big Five extraversion was correlated with communication dimensions of 
extraversion including dramatic and dominant Communication Style and then these 
subscales of Communication Style were correlated with each other to examine 
differences in the magnitude of the relationships. 
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For Big Five factor 1, the psychological measures of extraversion, 9 of the 
possible 27 subscales were theorized to be similar based on content. This included 
the Strategic Performance subscale of the Affinity Seeking measure and also the 
Communication Styles of dramatic, dominant, and animated. Communication 
Adaptability subscales that were included under factor 1 consisted of social 
confirmation, social experience, also the Interaction Involvement subscale of 
responsiveness was included. Two subscales of the 15-item Semantic Differential 
including measures of sociability and extroversion were categorized under Big Five 
extraversion. 
For the Big Five factor 2, the psychological measure of agreeableness, three 
communication subscales were theorized to be measuring the same construct. These 
included the Communication Style of friendly, contentiousness (negative 
relationship), and the Affinity Seeking Competence subscale of Affinity Seeking. 
Conscientiousness, Big Five factor 3, had 2 communication measures that were 
theorized to be related to it. These included the articulation subscale of 
Communication Adaptability and the precise subscale of Communication Style. 
Factor 4, emotional stability, was represented by three communication measures. 
These included the Communication Style subscale of relaxed, the Semantic 
Differential subscale of composure and the Communication subscale of social 
composure. Factor 5, culture/intelligence, was theorized to be represented by 
Communication subscale of open, Semantic Differential subscale of character and 
competence, and the Interaction Involvement subscale of perceptiveness. 
For the second analysis, Self-Monitoring was correlated with the other 
measures of psychological and communication measures, to establish that it is a 
construct that is both psychologically and communication-based. For the final 
analysis, participants self-ratings on the Big Five will be examined across sessions 
and cross comparisons will be conducted to determine whether psychological 




The Affinity Seeking instrument (Table 4) consists of two subscales, affinity 
seeking competence, and strategic performance, which had means of 40.89 and 21.63 
and standard deviations of 6.85 and 5.61, respectively across the 224 participants that 
were used for the analysis. The six scales of the Communicative Adaptability 
included social composure, with a mean of 12.65 and standard deviation of 4.27, 
social confirmation with a mean of 12.33 and a standard deviation of 4.67, 
articulation with a mean of 12.61 and a standard deviation of 4.24. Social experience 
had a mean of 12.62 and a standard deviation of 4.72, appropriate disclosure had a 
mean of 13.24 and a standard deviation of 3.52, and wit with a mean of 14.66 and a 
standard deviation of 3.53. 
Communicator Style (Table 4) consisted of 11 subscales. These included 
friendly, with a mean of 14.97 and a standard deviation of 3.54, impression leaving, 
with a mean of 14.16 and a standard deviation of 3.54, relaxed, with a mean of 12.77 
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and a standard deviation of 2.56, open, with a mean of 11.76 and a standard deviation 
of 3.37. Contentious, with a mean of 12.84 and a standard deviation of 3.34, 
attentive, with a mean of 13.95 and a standard deviation of 2.42, precise with a mean 
of 13.18 and a standard deviation of2.46, dramatic, with a mean of 12.96 and a 
standard deviation of 2.93. Dominant, with a mean of 11.66 and a standard deviation 
of 3.09, communicator image, with a mean of 17.14 and a mean of2.90 and 
animated, with a mean of 13.92 and a standard deviation 2.51. 
Interaction involvement's (Table 4) three subscales include perceptiveness, 
attentiveness and responsive. Perceptiveness had a mean of 20.12 and a standard 
deviation of 3.49, attentiveness had a mean of 29.52 and a standard deviation of 5.09, 
and responsiveness with a mean of 39.44 with a standard deviation of 8.32. 
Semantic differential (Table 4) consisted of five domains, including 
sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, character. Sociability had a mean 
of 17 .59 and a standard deviation of 2.60, extroversion had a mean of 14.57 and a 
standard deviation of 3.79, competence with a mean of 16.29 with a standard 
deviation of 2.32, composure with a mean of 14.84 with a standard deviation of 3.44, 
and character with a mean of 17.99 and a standard deviation of 2.65. 
Participants' average self-monitoring score (Table 4) was 56.33 with a 
standard deviation of7.64. Factor 1, extraversion, had an average of36.10 and a 
standard deviation of 7. 77 at time 1 and a mean 36.61 and a standard deviation of 
7.26 at time 2. Factor 2, agreeableness, had an average of 38.54 and a standard 
deviation of 5.78 at time 1and39.03 and a standard deviation of6.14 at time 2. 
Factor 3, conscientiousness, had a mean of 34.54 and a standard deviation of 6.45 at 
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time 1 and a mean of37.89 and a standard deviation of7.21 at time 2. Factor 4, 
emotional stability, had a mean of 34.46 and standard deviation of7.51 at time 1 and 
a mean of 35.68 and a standard deviation of7.76 at time 2. Factor 5, 
culture/intelligence had a mean of 36.55 with a standard deviation of 6.32 at time 1 
and a mean of 38.81 and a standard deviation of 5.51 at time 2. 
First Analysis: Psychological and Communication Measure Similarity and the Role of 
Self-Monitoring 
Factor 1 of the Big Five, extraversion at time 1, was correlated with another 
psychological measure, self-monitoring, yielding a significant correlation (Table 5), r 
= .48 n = 224 p = .000. Extraversion was then correlated with a variety of 
communication measures that measure extraversion (content-wise). All subsequent 
correlations reported involved n = 224 and significant tests reported were one-tailed. 
These included Communicator Style subscales of dramatic, r = .319 p = .000, 
dominant, r = .45 p = .000, animated, r =.33 p = .000, Affinity Seeking's subscale of 
strategic performance r = .23 p = .000, Communicative Adaptability's subscales of 
social confirmation r = -.07 p = .158, social experience r = -.31 p = .000, Semantic 
Differential's subscales of sociability, r = .30 p = .000 and extroversion r = .72 p = 
.000 and Interaction Involvement's subscale ofresponsiveness, r = .384 p = .000. 
Factor 2 of the Big Five, agreeableness was correlated with another 
psychological measure, self-monitoring, (Table 5) r = -.07 p = .14. Agreeableness 
was correlated with communication measures that were theorized to be related to 
agreeableness, they included Communicator Style subscale of friendly, r = .28 p = 
.000, contentious, r = -.30 p = .000 and the Affinity Seeking subscale of affinity 
seeking competence, r = .19 p =.000. 
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Factor 3 of the Big Five, conscientiousness was correlated with another 
psychological measure, self-monitoring, (Table 5) r = -.06 p = .20. Conscientiousness 
was correlated with Communication Adaptability's subscale of articulation, r = -.20 p 
= .000 and Communicator Style subscale of precise, r = .13 p = .030. 
Factor 4 of the Big Five, emotional stability, was correlated with self-
monitoring, (Table 5) r = .25 p = .000. Emotional stability was correlated with 
Communicator Style subscale of relaxed, r = .41 p = .000, Semantic Differential of 
composure r = .63 p =.000, and Communicator Adaptability subscale of social 
composure r = -.19 p =.000. 
Factor 5 of the Big Five, culture/intelligence, was correlated with self-
monitoring, (Table 5) r = .29 p = .000. Culture was correlated with the 
Communicator Style subscale of open r = .23 p =.000, Semantic Differential subscale 
of character r = .39 p = .000 and competence r = .52 p = .000 and Interaction 
Involvement subscale of perceptiveness r = .26 p =.000. 
To examine whether self-monitoring is conceptually a psychological measure 
or a communication measure, self-monitoring was correlated with various 
psychological measures and communication measures. As previously stated, self-
monitoring was significantly correlated with extraversion, emotional stability and 
culture/intelligence, factors 1, 4, and 5 of the Big Five. Across the communication 
measures, self-monitoring was correlated with the two subscales of the Affinity 
Seeking instrument, (Table 6) affinity seeking competence r = .30 p = .000, and 
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strategic performance r = .40 p = .000. The six scales of the Communicative 
Adaptability were correlated with self-monitoring and these included social 
composure, (Table 5) r = -.24 p = .000, social confirmation, r = -.01 p = .418, 
articulation, -.12 p = .037, social experience, r = -.26 p = .000, appropriate disclosure, 
r =-.01 p = .451 , and wit, r = -.25 p = .000. 
Self-monitoring was correlated with the 11 subscales of Communicator Style 
11 , (Table 6) these include friendly, r = .15 p =. 012, impression leaving, r = .29 p = 
.000, relaxed, r = .20 p = .001, open, r = .34 p = .000. Contentious, r = .17 p = .005, 
attentive, r = .04 p = .282, precise, r = .14 p = .017, dramatic, r = .48 p = .000. 
Dominant, r = .50 p = .000 and animated, r = .29 p = .000. 
Self-monitoring was correlated with Interaction involvement's three subscales 
including perceptiveness, attentiveness and responsive (Table 6). Perceptiveness, r = 
.17 p =.005, attentiveness, r = .01, p = .462, and responsiveness, r = .29 p = .000. 
Self-monitoring was correlated with Semantic differential consisted of five domains, 
including sociability, extroversion, competence, composure, character. Sociability, r 
= .18 p = .004, extroversion, r = .55 p = .000, competence, r = .19 p = .002, 
composure, r = .21 p = .001 and character r = -.01 p = .424. 
Second Analysis: Change in Self-Concept 
Change in self-rating or self-concept was analyzed in three ways. In the first 
approach, there was a comparison of self-ratings within groups across the two testing 
conditions. In the second approach, there was a "cross-comparison" made comparing 
the 1st session of one group versus the 2nd session of other group, this analysis would 
provide insight into whether assessing information about the self in either a 
72 
psychological or communication-based manner would influence self-rating. In the 
final analysis, there was a comparison of time 1 and time 2 self-ratings within group 
based on level of self-monitoring to determine whether high self-monitors showed a 
greater change in self-rating after completing various psychological or 
communication measures. 
Multiple paired-samples one-tailed t-tests were conducted comparing self-
ratings across sessions for the group of participants that received communication 
measures in the first session and psychology measures in the second session 
("communication-first") and the group that received psychology measures in the first 
session and communication measures in the second session ("psych-first") (Table 7). 
"Com-first" participants' self-ratings on the Big Five (Table 7) consisted of means of 
35.28 and 36.29 and standard deviations of 7.36 and 7.25 for ratings of extraversion 
on session 1 and session 2, yielding t( 123) = 2.418 p = .017, indicating a significant 
increase in self-rated extraversion from session 1 to session 2. Ratings on 
agreeableness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2 from 38.09 to 38.90 
with standard deviations of 6.25 and 6.08, t(123) =l.687 p = .047. Ratings on 
conscientiousness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 34.00 
to 38.03 with standard deviations of 6.03 and 7.27, t(l23) = 8.03 p = .000. Ratings on 
emotional stability significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 34.14 
to 35.21 with standard deviations of 7.61 and 7.93, t(123)= 2.48 p =.007. Ratings on 
culture significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, means of 35.06 to 38.34 
with standard deviations of 5.73 and 5.59, t(123) = 7.82 p =.000. 
73 
Mean "Psychology-firsf' participants' self-ratings on extraversion (Table 7) 
decreased from 37.25 to 37.11 with standard deviations of 8.10 and 7.32, t(105) = -
.23 p = .415. Mean ratings on agreeableness increased from session 1 to session 2 
from 39.12 to 39.23, and standard deviations of5.17 and 6.21, t(105) =.29 p = .385. 
Ratings on conscientiousness significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, 
means of were 35.08 to 37.88 with standard deviations of 6.91 and 7.27, t(105) = 5.46 
p = .000. Ratings on emotional stability significantly increased from session 1 to 
session 2, means of 34.88 to 36.23 with standard deviations of7.32 and 7.44, t(105)= 
2.04 p =.022. Ratings on culture significantly increased from session 1 to session 2, 
means of 38.18 to 39.26 with standard deviations of 6.50 and 5.45, t(105) = 1.85 p 
=.034. 
Cross comparisons were conducted, comparing session 1 self-ratings of the 
com-first group and session 2 self-ratings of the psych-first group using independent-
samples t-tests (Table 8). There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of 
extraversion for these groups, means of 35.61 and 37.11, standard deviations of7.50 
and 7 .32, t(252) = -1.59 p = .057, thus self-ratings were higher in the second session 
of the psych-first group. There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of 
agreeableness for these groups, with means of 38.16 and 39.28, and standard 
deviations of 5.92 and 6.21, t(251) = -1.45 p = .074. There was a significant 
difference between mean self-ratings of conscientiousness for these groups, means of 
34.09 and 37.88, and standard deviations of 5.93 and 7.27, t(196.93) = -4.41 p = .000. 
There was a marginal difference between self-ratings of emotional stability for these 
groups, means of 34. 72 and 36.23, standard deviations of 7.42 and 7.44, t(252) = -
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1.59 p = .057. There was significant difference between self-ratings of culture for 
these groups, means were 35.33 and 39.26, with standard deviations of 5.67 and 5.45, 
t(252) = -5.54 p = .000. 
Further cross comparisons were conducted, comparing session 1 self-ratings 
of the psych-first group and session 2 self-ratings of the com-first group employing 
the same statistical procedures (Table 8). There was not a significant difference 
between self-ratings of extraversion for these groups, means of 36.31 and 37 .53 and 
standard deviations of 7.23 and 7.86, t(254) = -1.29 p = .094. There was not a 
significant difference between self-ratings of agreeableness for these groups, means 
of 38.88 and 38.92 and standard deviations of 6.06 and 5.33, t(254) = -.06 p = .951. 
There was a significant difference between self-ratings of conscientiousness for these 
groups, means of38.10 and 35.15 and standard deviations of7.28 and 6.85, t(254) = 
3.34 p = .001, indicating that com-first session 2 self-ratings were higher then psych-
first session 1 self-ratings. There was not a significant difference between self-
ratings of emotional stability for these groups, means of 35.25 and 35.01 and standard 
deviations of 7.91 and 6.93, t(254) = .26 p = .40. There was not a significant 
difference between self-ratings of culture for these groups, means of 38.34 and 38.22 
and standard deviations of 5.57 and 6.26, t(254) = .16 p = .44. 
For the third analysis, participants were divided into groups based on their 
self-monitoring scores (Table 9). Participants who scored 54 and above were 
assigned to a group as high self-monitors and groups that scored below 54 were 
assigned to a group as low self-monitors. These groups were then compared with 
paired-samples tests to determine whether low or high self-monitors rated themselves 
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differently across sessions. Low self-monitors reported no significant difference 
between ratings of extraversion in session 1 to session 2 (Table 9) with means of 
32.54 and 33.02 and standard deviations of7.02 and 6.80, t(82) = .88 p = .19. Low 
self-monitors reported no significant difference between ratings of agreeableness in 
session 1 to session 2 with means of39.61and39.88 and standard deviations of 6.29 
and 5.81, t(81) = .42 p = .34. Low self-monitors reported a significant increase in 
ratings of conscientiousness in session 1 to session 2 with means of 35.01 and 38.55 
and standard deviations of 6.92 and 7.06, t(82) = 6.73 p = .000. Low self-monitors 
reported a significant increase in ratings of emotional stability in session 1 to session 
2 with means of 32.58 and 33.87 and standard deviations of7.65 and 8.01, t(82) = 
2.19 p = .02. Low self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of culture in 
session 1 to session 2 with means of34.54 and 37.30 and standard deviations of 5.89 
and 5.70, t(82) = 4.97 p = .00. 
High self-monitors reported no significant difference between ratings of 
extraversion in session 1 to session 2 (Table 9) with means of 38.23 and 38.74 and 
standard deviations of7.44 and 6.71, t(144) = 1.12 p = .13. High self-monitors 
reported a marginal increase in ratings of agreeableness in session 1 to session 2 with 
means of37.97 and 38.64 and standard deviations of 5.38 and 6.30, t(144) = 1.59 p = 
.06. High self-monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of conscientiousness 
in session 1 to session 2 with means of 34.37 and 37.68 and standard deviations of 
6.15 and 7.35, t(144) = 6.92 p = .00. High self-monitors reported a significant 
increase in ratings of emotional stability in session 1 to session 2 with means of 35.56 
and 36.67 and standard deviations of7.23 and 7.43, t(144) = 2.20 p = .02. High self-
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monitors reported a significant increase in ratings of culture in session l to session 2 
with means of37.64 and 39.67 and standard deviations of 6.28 and 5.25, t(l44) = 
4.27 p = .00. 
DISCUSSION 
The first analysis examined the relationship between psychological and 
communication measures of self-concept. Many communication measures that the 
author believed were related to the psychological measures of a similar construct, 
showed a significant positive correlation in most cases, or a negative correlation of 
significant magnitude. In some situations, communication measures of a similar 
construct had significant correlations of greater magnitude than the correlations 
between psychological measures. For example, the correlation between semantic 
differential extroversion and Big Five extraversion (.72) was dramatically higher then 
the correlation between self-monitoring and Big Five extraversion (.48). This finding 
has many important implications. These results indicates that measures used in 
psychology and communication are assessing the same underlying construct, even 
though the measure's content may focus on communication style instead of 
personality traits and vice versa. This has far reaching implications as it establishes 
the interdisciplinary nature of both disciplines, in that both disciplines measure areas 
of interest that are assessed by the other (Figure 1 ). 
It is important to mention that these findings are not simply confined to 
extraversion. Similar results occurred for factors 4 and 5 of the Big Five, emotional 
stability and culture. Emotional stability and culture showed significant correlations 
with self-monitoring, but there were correlations of greater magnitude found when 
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comparing communication measures with these factors. Emotional stability had 
relationships of greater magnitude with the Communicator Style subscale relaxed and 
the Semantic Differential subscale of composure. The magnitude of the semantic 
differential composure relationship with emotional stability was about 2.5 times as 
large as emotional stability's relationship with self-monitoring. Also, it is important 
to point out that a measure besides the Semantic Differential score was highly 
correlated with a Big Five factor, indicating that the magnitude of the relationship is 
not constrained to a particular communication measure. Culture demonstrated 
stronger relationships with the Semantic Differential subscales character and 
competence than with self-monitoring, further supporting previous points. 
Self-monitoring should be conceptualized as both a communication measure 
and psychological measure as it significantly correlated with 3 of the 5 Big Five 
factors and numerous communication subscales. Significant correlations of large 
magnitude occurred across different scales, and on scales with different conceptual 
foundations. For example, self-monitoring was highly correlated with the Affinity 
Seeking subscales of affinity seeking competence and strategic performance, and also 
with the Communicator Style subscales of dramatic, dominant, open, and animated. 
For the second set of analyses, there was mixed support for the hypotheses. 
Participants who received communication measures before the second self-rating 
reported significant increases in their self-ratings in all factors of the Big Five. 
Participants who received psychological measures before their second self-rating 
reported significant increases on factors 3 through 5 of the Big Five. However, the 
crossed comparisons that were conducted provide greater insight into these findings. 
Crossed comparisons indicate that participants who received psychological 
measures in the first session had marginally higher self-ratings of extraversion at 
session 2 than participants in the first session before receiving any communication 
measures. Similar results were found when participants had marginally or 
significantly higher self-ratings on the other factors of the Big Five compared to 
participants who had not yet received any measures. Regarding the other crossed 
comparison, participants that received communication measures had similar self-
ratings at time 2, compared to session 1 self-ratings of participants who had not 
received psychological measures. The exception was for conscientiousness, which 
participants reported a higher level at time 2. 
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Finally, low and high self-monitors reported being similarly influenced by the 
psychological and communication measures. Both groups reported significant 
increases in Big Five factors 3 through 5. Thus, there was little support that change in 
self-rating would be moderated by self-monitoring. 
Although these results are interesting and tentatively assess the assumptions of 
the proposed model, there are some drawbacks that need to be discussed. Like all 
correlational research, it is nearly impossible to assess the influence that various 
factors have on other factors. Relational data provide information on the common 
variance that each shares, but this common variance may be influenced by a third 
factor (or more) that is not directly observable. Another drawback of this research is 
the manner in which forms were presented to participants. Participants received each 
set of forms in a particular order. Theoretically, forms that came later in the set were 
influenced by the responses on the earlier forms. Forms that came later are also more 
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likely to be filled out differently due to response burden, or participant fatigue. The 
former issue is typically solved with placing forms in random order, but the number 
of forms that were used and the design of the study made it logistically impossible to 
order the forms randomly. 
As Study 2 evidences, self-monitoring can be conceptualized as both a 
communication and a psychological construct, as it significantly correlated with 
measures that were both psychological and communication-based. Also importantly, 
self-ratings change after appraising both communication acts and psychological traits. 
These changes mark as self-concept is influenced and subsequently adjusted by these 
two types of appraisals. This indicates that both the psychological perspective of the 
development of the self-concept and communication perspective are both "right". A 
construct that is germane to both perspectives such as self-monitoring can be used to 
integrate the two perspectives into one coherent model. 
Results from Study 1 remind us that self-monitors are influenced differently 
by social information. High self-monitors seem to engage in more heuristic 
processing as evidenced by their lack of disagreeing thoughts, and low self-monitors 
systematically process information about self and make a decision regarding self (or 
self adjustment) as evidenced by their disagreeing thoughts. High self-monitors may 
not negotiate their self-concept in the traditional sense of self-reflected appraisal, but 
rely more on interactions with others in their social settings. In effect, they develop 
their self-concept through others. Then, this raises the issue of whether they have a 
self-concept or a meaningful conceptualization of who they are. 
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It is crucial to remember that the results implicating self-monitoring as both a 
communication and a psychological construct are both correlational and tentative in 
nature and require further analysis, such as structural equation modeling, to determine 
if both of these variables load on a latent factor of self-concept. Again, with 
correlational research, it is impossible to assume causality, which is implicated in the 
proposed model. The current analysis did not determine directionality of causes, but 
it did provide support for some underlying assumptions regarding the model. This is 
an important first step towards advocating and outlining a path for further empirical 
investigation. 
Future studies that could be conducted would use actual communication acts 
to further examine the influence that communication has on the self-concept. It was 
not feasible, economically or time-wise (as Professors would not allow more then 
fifteen minutes per session), to conduct a laboratory experiment that would allow the 
author to examine this influence. Therefore, r esults from the two experiments were 
extrapolated from a rather artificial environment through artificial means. On the 
other hand, the surprising patterns and significant results strengthen the posited 
interdisciplinary joining. This limitation reduces the generalizability of the current 
results as it now fundamentally cogent to consider the self-concept as malleable and 
fluid in nature. These artificial limitations reduce the rich amount of social 
information that occurs when dyads or groups interact with each other. This is a 
significant problem that has held back the potential prominence of the social 
cognitive perspective in general and has been extensively discussed in both the 
disciplines of psychology and communication. This investigation is a major step in 
the multiple and previously independent perspectives of the communication and 
psychology fields to yield a stronger explanatory model for self-monitoring. 
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APPENDICES 
1. STUDY 1 FORMS 
Informed Consent Document 
The University of Rhode Island 
Department of Communication Studies 
308A Independence Hall 
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH 
You have been asked to take part in a research project described below. The 
researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask 
questions. If you have more questions later, call Dr. Geoff Leatham, the person 
mainly responsible for this study, at (401) 874-4735, and he will discuss them with 
you. You must be at least 18 years old to be in this research project. 
Description of the project: 
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You have been asked to take part in a study that is concerned with the interaction of 
personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interaction for the purpose 
of furthering information regarding self-concept and self-monitoring. 
What will be done: 
If you decide to take part in this study here is what will happen: You are asked to 
participate in two sessions. In the first session you will complete two scales. After 
finishing the first session, you will then have a one-week absence and you will meet 
with the researchers again to complete the second session in which you will complete 
four separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by three 
separate forms. Both sessions will take approximately fifteen minutes each, for a 
total participation time of approximately thirty minutes. The research data will be 
kept for at least three years following the completion of the study. 
Risks or discomfort: 
You will not experience any risks of discomfort as a result of your participation in 
this study. Anyone that does not want to participate in the two sessions of the study 
can leave with their professor and he/she will have an alternative exercise provided 
for you. Both failure to participate (or participation) will not affect the student's 
grade in any way. 
Benefits of this study: 
Although there will be no direct benefit to you for taking part in this study, the 
researcher may learn more about the variables under consideration. You will have the 
experience of being a participant in a research study. 
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Confidentiality: 
Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by 
name. All records will ensure participant's confidentiality, while also ensuring that 
the participant's responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. The 
participant will write a word and one number that they will easily be able to recall as 
a password for both the first and the second sessions on their data packets, again 
ensuring that the participant's name is held confidential. 
In case there is any injury to the subject: 
If this study causes you any injury, you should write or call the office of the Vice 
Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, 
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328. 
Decision to quit at any time: 
The decision to take part in this study is up to you. You do not have to participate. If 
you decide to take part in the study, you may quit at any time. Whatever you decide 
will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. If you wish to 
quit, you simply inform Dr. Geoff Leatham at (401) 874-4735 of your decision. 
Rights and Complaints: 
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your 
complaints with Geoff Leatham or with Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or 
crystalrosef@yahoo.com anonymously, if you choose. In addition, you may contact 
the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower 
College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, 
telephone: (401) 874-4328. 
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your 
signature on this form means that you understand the information and you agree to 
participate in this study. 
Signature of Participant Signature of Researcher 
Typed/printed name Typed/printed Name 
Date Date 
The University of Rhode Island 
Department of Communication Studies 
308A Independence Hall 
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811 
TEAR OFF AND KEEP THIS FORM FOR YOURSELF 
Dear Participant: 
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You have been asked to take part in the research project described below. If you have 
any questions, please feel free to call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or Dr. Geoff 
Leatham at (401) 874-4735 the people mainly responsible for this study. 
The purpose of this study is to furthering information regarding self-concept and self-
monitoring. Responses to these items will consist of circling numbers of the various 
forms that are distributed to you. Confidentiality will be maintained as none of the 
information will identify you by name. Your password that you create will ensure 
participant's confidentiality, while also ensuring that the participant's responses can 
be linked from session 1 and session 2. The participant will write a word and one 
number that they will easily be able to recall as a password for both the first and the 
second sessions on their data packets, again ensuring that the participants name is 
held confidential. 
YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD to be in this research project. 
If you decide to take part in this study, your participation will involve filling out a 
total of six questionnaires pertaining to self-monitoring and self-rating. 
The possible risks or discomforts of the study are minimal, although some of you may 
feel some embarrassment answering questions about private matters, but remember 
that you can refuse to answer any question. 
Although there are no direct benefits of the study, your answers will help increase the 
knowledge regarding the variables of interest (self-monitoring and self-ratings). 
Your part in this study is anonymous. That means that your answers to all questions 
are private. No one else can know if you participated in this study and no one else 
can find out what your answers were. Scientific reports will be based on group data 
and will not identify you or any individual as being in this project. The research data 
will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study. 
The decision to participate in this research project is up to you. You do not have to 
participate and you can refuse to answer any question. Whatever you decide will in 
no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. 
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Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you. However, 
if this study causes you any injury, you should write or call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 
874-7486 or Geoff Leatham at (401) 874-4735 both are located at the University of 
Rhode Island. 
If you have any more questions or concerns about this study, you may contact 
University of Rhode Island's Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and 
Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, URI, Kingston, RI, (401) 874-4328. 
You are at least 18 years old. You have read the consent form and your questions 
have been answered to your satisfaction. Your filling out the survey implies your 
consent to participate in this study. 
Thank you, 
Dr. Geoff Leatham 
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2. Study 1 Questionnaire Materials 
SM Scale 
Instructions: Please read each statement below and then circle a number that best 
describes how much you agree with each statement in regards to how you see 
yourself, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". 
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Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 




















































11. I would not change my opinions (or the way that I do things) in order to please 



















































































Instructions: Please rate yourself on these 25 traits by circling one 
number between each pair of adjectives that best reflects how you see 
yourself. 
89 
Argumentative 1------2------3-----4-----5-----6------7-------8-----9-----10 Good Natured 





Unambitious 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Ambitious 
Quiet 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Talkative 
Un- 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Cooperative 
cooperative 
Emotionally 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Emotionally 
Unstable Stable 
Extraverted 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Introverted 
Agreeable 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Disagreeable 
Lazy 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Hardworking 
Academically 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Academically 
Responsible Irresponsible 
Not Studious 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Studious 






1------2------3------4------5------6------ 7-----8-----9-----10 Unsociable 
Imaginative 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Unimaginative 










Unintelligent 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Intelligent 
Uncultured 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Cultured 
Unconfident 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Confident 
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Instructions: 
Please answer both questions 
1. Are you introverted? D D D 
Yes No Sometimes 
2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your: 
•!• past behaviors, 
•!• thoughts, 
•!• feelings 





Please answer both questions 
1. Are you extraverted? D D D 
Yes No Sometimes 
2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your: 
•!• past behaviors, 
•!• thoughts, 
•!• feelings 





How variable is your extraversion from one situation to another? 
Low variability 1----2----3----4----5----6----7-----8-----9---10 High Variability 
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How variable is your introversion from one situation to another? 
Low variability 1----2----3----4----5----6----7-----8-----9---10 High Variability 
95 
Participant Demographic Information 
Instructions: Please read the questions below and then fill in the answer in the blank. 
1. What is your age? __ 
2. What is your gender? ____ _ 
3. What is your race/ethnicity? ___________ _ 
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3. STUDY 2 FORMS 
Informed Consent Documents 
Informed Consent Document 
This study is concerned with the interaction of personality and situational 
factors regarding interpersonal interaction. You are asked to participate in two 
sessions. In the first session you will complete two scales. After finishing the first 
session, you will then have a two-week absence and you will meet with the 
researchers again to complete the second session in which you will complete four 
separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by three separate 
forms. Both sessions will take approximately ten to fifteen minutes each. 
Should you wish to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to contact 
Dr. Sandra Ketrow in the Communications Studies Department at the University of 
Rhode Island (401- 874- 4733). We have no reason to believe that you will 
experience any discomfort as a result of participation in this experiment. If you do 
experience any discomfort, please contact Dr. Ketrow. 
Your responses will be anonymous so please do not write your name on any 
of the data collection forms. However, in order to establish what forms participants 
filled out across the two sessions, you are requested to legibly print your name on a 
separate sheet. 
Instructors of the class will not see the sheet of those who have participated in 
the study. A research assistant, independent of the class and the instructor, will be the 
only individual that sees the forms and has access to these forms. After the study is 
completed, all forms that have been signed will be destroyed. You may withdraw 
from this study at any time, during or between sessions, with no negative 
consequences. Simply inform the experimenters that you wish to end participation. 
After you have signed the consent form, it will be placed in a file with the 
other consent forms in no particular order, separate from your data packets. This is 
done to ultimately protect your anonymity. Your informed consent to participate in 
this study will end on May 18, 2003. 
I agree to participate in this study ________________ _ 
Signature 
I do not agree to participate in this study ______________ _ 
Signature 
The University of Rhode Island 
Department of Communication Studies 
308A Independence Hall 
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH 
You have been asked to take part in a research project entitled "The Malleability of 
Self-Concept and the Moderating Role of Self-Monitoring" described below. The 
researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask 
questions. If you have more questions later, call Dr. SandraKetrow, the person 
mainly responsible for this study, at (401) 874-4733, and he will discuss them with 
you. You must be at least 18 years old to be in this research project. 
Description of the project: 
97 
You have been asked to take part in a study that is concerned with the interaction of 
personality and situational factors regarding interpersonal interaction for the purpose 
of furthering information regarding self-concept and self-monitoring. 
What will be done: 
If you decide to take part in this study here is what will happen: You are asked to 
participate in two sessions. In the first session you will complete five scales. After 
finishing the first session, you will then have a one-week respite and you will meet 
with the researcher again to complete the second session in which you will complete 
seven separate forms. The first form will be a general question, followed by seven 
separate forms. Both sessions will take approximately fifteen minutes each, for a 
total participation time of approximately thirty minutes. The research data will be 
kept for at least three years following the completion of the study. 
Risks or discomfort: 
You will not experience any risks of discomfort as a result of your participation in 
this study. If you do riot want to participate in the two sessions of the study, you can 
leave with your professor and an alternative exercise will be provided. Neither your 
failure to participate nor participation will affect the student's grade in any way. 
Benefits of this study: 
Although there will be no direct benefit to you for taking part in this study, the 
researcher may learn more about the variables under consideration. You will have the 
experience of being a participant in a research study. 
Confidentiality: 
Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by 
name. All records will ensure your confidentiality, while also ensuring that your 
responses can be linked from session 1 and session 2. You will write a word and one 
number that you can easily recall as a password for both the first and the second 
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sessions on your data packets, again ensuring that your name is held confidential. 
The researcher will collect all consent forms without perusing any of them. All forms 
will be stored in the faculty supervisor's filing cabinet. 
In case there is any injury to the subject: 
If this study causes you any injury, you should write or call the office of the Vice 
Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, 
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328. 
Decision to quit at any time: 
The decision to take part in this study is up to you. You do not have to participate. If 
you decide to take part in the study, you may quit at any time. Whatever you decide 
will in no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. If you wish to 
quit, you simply inform Dr. SandraKetrow at (401) 874-4733 of your decision. 
Rights and Complaints: 
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your 
complaints with Dr. Sandra Ketrow or with Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or 
cfon0630@postoffice.uri.edu anonymously, if you choose. In addition, you may 
contact the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and Outreach, 
70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, 
telephone: (401) 874-4328. 
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your 
signature on this form means that you understand the information and you agree to 
participate in this study. 
Signature of Participant Signature of Researcher 
Typed/printed name Typed/printed N arne 
Date Date 
The University of Rhode Island 
Department of Communication Studies 
308A Independence Hall 
Kingston, Rhode Island 02881-0811 
TEAR OFF AND KEEP THIS FORM FOR YOURSELF 
Dear Participant: 
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You have been asked to take part in the research project described below. If you have 
any questions, please feel free to call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 874-7486 or Dr. 
Sandra Ketrow at (401) 874-4733 (the researchers mainly responsible for this study). 
The purpose of this study is to further knowledge about self-concept and self-
monitoring. Your responses to these items will consist of circling numbers on the 
various forms that are distributed. Confidentiality will be maintained as none of the 
information will identify you by name. Your password that you create will ensure 
your confidentiality, while also ensuring that your responses can be linked from 
session 1 and session 2. You will write a word and one number that they will easily 
be able to recall as a password for both the first and the second sessions on your data 
packet, again ensuring that your name is held confidential. 
YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD to be in this research project. 
If you decide to take part in this study, your participation will involve filling out a 
total of six questionnaires pertaining to self-monitoring and self-rating. 
The possible risks or discomforts of the study are minimal, although some of you may 
feel some embarrassment answering questions about private matters, but remember 
that you can refuse to answer any question. 
Although there are no direct benefits of the study, your answers will help increase the 
knowledge regarding the variables of interest (self-monitoring and self-ratings). 
Your part in this study is anonymous. That means that your answers to all questions 
are private. No one else can know if you participated in this study and no one else 
can find out what your answers were. Scientific reports will be based on group data 
and will not identify you or any individual as being in this project. The research data 
will be kept for at least three years following the completion of the study. 
The decision to participate in this research project is up to you. You do not have to 
participate and you can refuse to answer any question. Whatever you decide will in 
no way penalize you, affect your grade, or status as a student. 
Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you. However, 
if this study causes you any injury, you should write or call Crystal Fonseca at (401) 
874-7486 or Dr. Sandra Ketrow at (401) 874-4733 both are located at the University 
of Rhode Island. 
If you have any more questions or concerns about this study, you may contact 
University of Rhode Island's Vice Provost for Graduate Studies, Research and 
Outreach, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, URI, Kingston, RI, (401) 874-4328. 
You are at least 18 years old. You have read the consent form and your questions 
have been answered to your satisfaction. Your filling out the survey implies your 
consent to participate in this study. 
Thank you, 
Dr. Sandra Ketrow 
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4. Study 2 Questionnaire Materials 
Communication Scales 
A. S. Instrument 
Instrnctions: For each of the following statements, please indicate your perceptions 
of your general abilities. That is, consider how you generally behave, rather than any 
specific conversation or event. Please use the below scale to respond to the following 
13 questions. Circle one answer per question that BEST represents the following 
categories to you: 
Very 
strongly Strongly 
agree agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
VSA SA A u D 
1. I seldom know what to say or do to get others to like me. 
VSA SA A U D 
2. If I put my mind to it, I could get anyone to like me. 
VSA SA A U D 
3. I have trouble building rapport with others. 
VSA SA A U D 








VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
5. If I want someone to like me, I can usually create positive feelings between us. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
6. I just can't seem to get others to like and appreciate me. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
7. I am good at getting others to want to hang around with me. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
8. I do not seem to know what to say and do to make myself popular with others. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
9. When necessary, I can put on an act to get important people to approve of me. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
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10. I am not very good at putting on a show to impress others. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
11. I am very good at playing roles to draw people to me. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
12. I can present myself as more likeable than I really am. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
13. I can put on excellent social performances to get others to approve of me. 
VSA SA A U D SD VSD 
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C. A. Scale 
Instructions: The following are statements about communication behaviors. Answer 
each item as it relates to your general style of communication (the type of 
communicator you are most often) in social situations. 
Please indicate the degree to which each statement applies to you by circling 
the appropriate statement at the end of each sentence. 
1. I feel nervous in social situations. 
Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
2. In most social situations I feel tense and constrained. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
3. When talking, my posture seems awkward and tense. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
4. My voice sounds nervous when I talk with others. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
5. I am relaxed when talking with others. 
Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
6. I try to make the other person feel good. 
Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
7. I try to make the other person feel important. 
Rarely 
true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
8. I try to be warm when communicating with another. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
9. When I'm talking I think about how the other person feels. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
10. I am verbally and nonverbally supportive of other people. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
11. I like to be active in different social groups. 
Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
12. I enjoy socializing with various groups of people. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
13. I enjoy meeting new people. 
Always Often 
true of me true of me 
Sometimes 
true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 





Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
I do not "mix" well at social functions. 
Always Often Sometimes 
true of me true of me true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
I am aware of how intimate my disclosures are. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
I am aware of how intimate the disclosures of others are. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
I disclose at the same level that others disclose to me. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
19. I know how appropriate my self-disclosures are. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
20. When I self-disclose I know what I am revealing. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely 
true of me true of me true of me true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
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21. When speaking I have problems with grammar. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
22. At times I don't use appropriate verb tense. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
23. I sometimes use one word when I mean to use another. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
24. I sometimes use words incorrectly. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
25. I have difficulty pronouncing some words. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
26. When I am anxious, I often make jokes. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
27. I often make jokes when in tense situations. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
28. When I embarrass myself, I often make a joke about it. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
29. When someone makes a negative comment about me, I respond with a witty 
comeback. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
30. People think I am witty. 
Always Often 
true of me true of me 
Sometimes 
true of me 
Rarely 
true of me 
Never 
true of me 
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C. S. Measure 
Instructions: You have impressions of yourself as a communicator. The impressions 
include your sense of the way you communicate. This measure focuses upon your 
sensitivity to the way you communicate, or what is called your communicator style. 
The questions are not designed to look at what is communicated; rather, they explore 
the way you communicate. 
Because there is no such thing as a "correct" style of communication, none of 
the following items has a right or wrong answer. Please do not spend too much time 
on the items. Let your first inclination be your guide. Try to answer as honestly as 
possible. All responses will be strictly confidential. 
Some questions will be difficult to answer because you honestly do not know. 
For these questions, however, please try to determine which way you are leaning and 
answer in the appropriate direction. 







Definition of feeling 
strong disagreement with the statement 
disagreement with the statement 
neither agreement nor disagreement with the 
statement 
agreement with the statement 
strong agreement with the statement 
For example, if you agree with the following statement, "I dislike the coldness of 
winter," then you would circle ("yes") on your scale. 
Some of the items will be similarly stated. But each item has a slightly 
different orientation. Try to answer each question as though it were the only question 
being asked. Finally, answer each item as it relates to a general face-to-face 
communication situation- namely, the type of communicator you are most often. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
I. I am comfortable with all varieties of people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
2. I laugh easily. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
3. I readily express admiration for others. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
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4. What I say usually leaves an impression on people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
5. I leave people with the impression of me which they definitely tent to remember. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
6. To be friendly, I habitually acknowledge verbally other's contributions. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
7 I am a very good communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
8. I have some nervous mannerisms in my speech. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
9. I am a very relaxed communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
10. When I disagree with somebody I am very quick to challenge them. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
11. I can always repeat back to a person exactly what was meant. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
12. The sound of my voice is very easy to recognize. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
13. I am a very precise communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
14. I leave a definite impression on people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
15. The rhythm or flow of my speech is sometimes affected by my nervousness. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
16. Under pressure I come across as a relaxed speaker. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
17. My eyes reflect exactly what I am saying. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
18. I dramatize a lot. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
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19. I always find it very easy to communicate on a one-to-one basis with strangers. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
20. Usually, I deliberately react in such a way that people know that I am listening to 
them. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
21. Usually I do not tell people much about myself until I get to know them well. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
22. Regularly I tell jokes, anecdotes and stories when I communicate. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
23. I tend to constantly gesture when I communicate. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
24. I am an extremely open communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
25. I am vocally a loud communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
26. In a small group of strangers I am a very good communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
27. In arguments I insist upon very precise definitions. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
28. In most social situations I generally speak very frequently. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
29. I find it extremely easy to maintain a conversation with a member of the opposite 
sex whom I have just met. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
30. I like to be strictly accurate when I communicate. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
31. Because I have a loud voice I can easily break into a conversation. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
32. Often I physically and vocally act out what I want to communicate. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
33. I have an assertive voice. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
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34. I readily reveal personal things about myself. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
35. I am dominant in social situations. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
36. I am very argumentative. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
37. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I have a hard time stopping myself. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
38. I am always an extremely friendly communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
39. I really like to listen very carefully to people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
40. Very often I insist that other people document or present some kind of proof for 
what they are arguing. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
41. I try to take charge of things when I am with people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
42. It bothers me to drop an argument that is not resolved. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
43. In most social situations I tend to come on strong. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
44. I am very expressive nonverbally in social situations. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
45. The way I say something usually leaves an impression on people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
46. Whenever I communicate, I tend to be very encouraging to people. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
47. I actively use a lot of facial expressions when I communicate. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
48. I am very frequently verbally exaggerate to emphasize a point. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
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49. I am an extremely attentive communicator. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
50. As a rule, I openly express my feelings and emotions. 
NO! no ? yes YES! 
51. Out of a random group of six people, including myself, I would probably have a 














I. I. Scale 
Instructions: This questionnaire is designed to provide information about how people 
communicate. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the items. You only 
need to indicate the extent to which you feel each item describes your behavior. 
In responding to some of the items, you might say, "sometimes I do that and 
sometimes I don't". You should respond to each item in a way that best describes 
your typical manner of communication - how you behave in most situations. If you 
cannot decide how a particular item applies to you, mark the "not sure" alternative. 
However, please be sure to respond to all of the items, based on the following scale. 
Circle one choice for each item that best characterizes your communication n general: 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
1. I am keenly aware of how other perceive me during conversations. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
2. My mind wanders during conversations and I often miss parts of what is going on. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
3. Often in conversations I'm not sure what to say, I can't seem to find the 
appropriate lines. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
4. I am very observant of others' reactions while I'm speaking. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
5. During conversations I listen carefully to others and obtain as much information 
as I can. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
6. Often in conversations I'm not sure what my role is, I'm not sure how I'm 
expected to relate to others. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
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7. Often in conversations I will pretend to be listening, when in fact I was thinking 
of something else. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
8. Often during conversations I feel like I know what should be said (like accepting 
a compliment, or asking a question), but I hesitate to do so. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
9. Sometimes during conversations I'm not sure what the other really means or 
intends by certain comments. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
10. I carefully observe how the other is responding to me during a conversation. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
11. Often I feel withdrawn or distant during conversations. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
12. Often in conversations I'm not sure what other's needs are (e.g., a compliment, 
reassurance, etc.) until it is too late to respond appropriately. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
13. I feel confident during my conversations, I am sure of what to say and do. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
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14. Often I'm preoccupied in my conversations and do not pay complete attention to 
others. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
15. Often I feel sort of"unplugged" during conversations, I am uncertain of my role, 
others' motives, and what is happening. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
16. In my conversations I often do not accurately perceive others' intentions or 
motivations. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
17. In conversations I am very perceptive to the meaning of my partners' behavior in 
relation to myself and the situation. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
18. Often during my conversation I can't think of what to say, I just don't react 
quickly enough. 
Not at all Not like Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Like Very much 
like me me unlike me like me me like me 
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S. D. Scale 
Instructions: From the scales below, please indicate your feelings about yourself 
below. Fill in the number between the adjectives which best represents your feelings 
about yourself. Numbers" 1" and "7" indicate a very strong feeling. Numbers "2" 
and "6" indicate a strong feeling. Numbers "3" and "5" indicate a fairly weak 
feeling. Number "4" indicates you are undecided or do not understand the adjectives 
themselves. Please work quickly. There are no right or wrong answers. Circle only 
ONE choice. 
Sociability 
Good-natured 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irritable 
Cheerful 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gloomy 
Unfriendly 2 3 4 5 6 7 Friendly 
Extroversion 
Timid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bold 
Verbal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Quiet 
Talkative 2 3 4 5 6 7 Silent 
Competence 
Expert 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inexpert 
Unintelligent 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
Intellectual 2 3 4 5 6 7 Narrow 
Composure 
Poised 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nervous 
Tense 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relaxed 
Calm 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anxious 
Character 
Dishonest 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest 
Unsympathetic 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad 
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Study 2 Questionnaire Materials 
Psychology Scales 
SM Scale 
Instructions: Please read each statement below and then circle a number that best 
describes how much you agree with each statement in regards to how you see 
yourself, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". 









































































































11. I would not change my opinions (or the way that I do things) in order to please 



















































































Instructions: Please rate yourself on these 25 traits by circling one 
number between each pair of adjectives that best reflects how you see 
yourself. 
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Argumentative 1------2------3-----4-----5-----6------7-------8-----9-----10 Good Natured 





Unambitious 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Ambitious 
Quiet 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Talkative 
Un- 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Cooperative 
cooperative 
Emotionally 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Emotionally 
Unstable Stable 
Extraverted 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Introverted 
Agreeable 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Disagreeable 
Lazy 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Hardworking 
Academically 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Academically 
Responsible Irresponsible 
Not Studious 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Studious 




1------2------3------4------5------6------ 7-----8-----9-----10 Sense 
of Humor 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Unsociable 
Imaginative 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Unimaginative 










Unintelligent 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Intelligent 
Uncultured 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Cultured 
Unconfident 1------2------3------4------5------6------7-----8-----9-----10 Confident 
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Instructions: 
Please answer both questions 
1. Are you introverted? D D D 
Yes No Sometimes 
2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your: 
•:• past behaviors, 
•:• thoughts, 
•:• feelings 





Please answer both questions 
1. Are you extraverted? D D D 
Yes No Sometimes 
2. In the space provided below, list some examples of your: 
•:• past behaviors, 
•:• thoughts, 
•:• feelings 





If you answered "sometimes" or "it depends" to the open ended question, "Are you 
extraverted": 
How variable is your extraversion from one situation to another? 
Low variability 1----2----3----4----5----6----7-----8-----9---10 High Variability 
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If you answered "sometimes" or "it depends" to the open ended question, "Are you 
introverted": 
How variable is your introversion from one situation to another? 
Low variability 1----2----3----4----5----6----7-----8-----9---10 High Variability 
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Participant Demographic Information 
Instructions: Please read the questions below and then fill in the answer in the blank. 
1. What is your age? __ 
2. What is your gender? ____ _ 
3. What is your race/ethnicity? ___________ _ 
S. D. Form 
Directions: Please circle either "Introvert" or "Extravert" below. 




"Someone who is oriented toward themselves, who prefers to be alone, 
is reserved, not extremely adventurous, unassertive, and submissive." 
•!• Extravert 
"Someone who is oriented toward the outside world, prefers the 
company of others, tends to be sociable, impulsive, adventurous, 
assertive and dominant." 
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Study 1 Tables 
Table 1. 2x2x2x2 ANOV A Change in Extraversion 
Effect F df p 
Time 1.47 (1,42) .23 
Type of Question .50 (1,42) .83 
Question Congruency 1.03 (1.42) .32 
Self-Monitoring 5.99 (1,42) .02 
Type of Question*Question Congruency 12.15 (1,42) .00 
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring .00 (1,42) .98 
Question Congruency* Self-Monitoring .50 (1.42) .83 
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring .59 (1,42) .45 
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Table 2. 2x2x2 ANOV A Listed Thoughts 
Agreeing Thoughts F df p 
Type of Question 1.62 (1,42) >.05 
Question Congruency 1.05 (1.42) >.05 
Self-Monitoring 1.49 (1,42) >.05 
Type of Question*Question Congruency .05 (1,42) .83 
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring .00 (1,42) >.05 
Question Congruency* Self-Monitoring 2.83 (1,42) .10 
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring 1.20 (1,42) >.05 
Disagreeing Thoughts F df p 
Type of Question .01 (1,42) >.05 
Question Congruency .47 (1.42) >.05 
Self-Monitoring .59 ( 1,42) >.05 
Type of Question*Question Congruency 6.78 (1,42) .01 
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring 3.28 (1,42) .07 
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring 1.43 (1,42) .24 
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring .18 (1,42) >.05 
Irrelevant Thoughts F df p 
Type of Question .24 (1 ,42) >.05 
Question Congruency .06 (1.42) >.05 
Self-Monitoring 1.28 (1,42) >.05 
Type of Question*Question Congruency 1.91 (1,42) .17 
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring .37 (1 ,42) >.05 
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring .13 (1,42) .72 
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring .60 (1 ,42) >.05 
Total Thoughts F df p 
Type of Question .77 (1,42) >.05 
Question Congruency .27 (1.42) >.05 
Self-Monitoring .00 (1,42) >.05 
Type of Question*Question Congruency 6.79 (1 ,42) .01 
Type of Question*Self-Monitoring 2.39 (1 ,42) >.05 
Question Congruency*Self-Monitoring 5.73 (1,42) .02 
Question Type*Congruence*Self-Monitoring 2.50 (1,42) >.05 
Table 3. Mediational Analyses 
Self-Monitoring 
Congruence 
























Study 2 Tables 
Table 4. 




Affinity Seeking Competence 40.89 6.85 
Strategic Performance 21.63 5.61 
Communication Adaptability 
Social Composure 12.65 4.27 
Social Confirmation 12.33 4.67 
Articulation 12.62 4.24 
Social Experience 12.62 4.72 
Appropriate Disclosure 13.24 3.52 
Wit 14.66 3.53 
Communicator Style 
Friendly 14.97 3.54 
Impression Leaving 14.16 3.53 
Relaxed 12.77 2.56 
Open 11.76 3.37 
Contentious 12.84 3.34 
Attentive 13.95 2.42 
Precise 13.18 2.45 
Dramatic 12.96 2.93 
Dominant 11.66 3.09 
Communicator Image 17.14 2.90 
Animated 13.92 2.51 
Interaction Involvement 
Perceptiveness 20.12 3.50 
Attentiveness 29.52 5.09 
Responsiveness 39.44 8.32 
Semantic Differential 
Sociability 17.59 2.61 
Extroversion 14.57 3.79 
Competence 16.29 2.33 
Composure 14.84 3.44 
Character 17.99 2.65 
Self-Monitoring 56.33 7.64 
Table 5. 
Correlations of Psychology Measures with Self-Monitoring and Communication 
Measures (N=224) 






























































Table 5 (Continued) 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability p 
Communicator Style 
Relaxed .41 .00 
Semantic Differential 
Composure .63 .00 
Communicator Adaptability 
Social Composure -.19 .00 
Factor 5-Culture p 
Communicator Style 
Open .23 .00 
Semantic Differential 
Character .39 .00 
Competence .52 .00 
Interaction Involvement 
Perceptiveness .26 .00 
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Table 6. 
Correlations of Self-Monitoring with Communication Measures 
Self-Monitoring (r) p (one-tailed) 
Affinity Seeking 
Affinity Seeking Competence .30 .00 
Strategic Performance .40 .00 
Communication Adaptability 
Social Composure -.24 .00 
Social Confirmation -.01 .42 
Articulation -.12 .04 
Social Experience -.26 .00 
Appropriate Disclosure -.01 .45 
Wit -.25 .00 
Communicator Style 
Friendly .15 .01 
Impression Leaving .29 .00 
Relaxed .20 .00 
Open .34 .00 
Contentious .17 .01 
Attentive .04 .28 
Precise .14 .02 
Dramatic .48 .00 
Dominant .50 .00 
Animated .29 .00 
Interaction Involvement 
Perceptiveness .17 .01 
Attentiveness .01 .46 
Responsiveness .29 .00 
Semantic Differential 
Sociability .18 .00 
Extroversion .55 .00 
Competence .19 .00 
Composure .21 .00 
Character -.01 .42 
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Table 7. 
Within Group Comparisons by Condition 
Com-First (n=124) Time 1 Time2 t p 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 35.28 7.36 36.29 7.25 2.42 .01 
Factor 2-Agreeableness 38.10 6.25 38.90 6.08 1.69 .05 
Factor 3-Conscientiousness 34.00 6.03 38.03 7.27 8.03 .00 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 34.14 7.61 35.21 7.93 2.48 .01 
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence 35.06 5.73 38.34 5.59 7.82 .00 
Psych-First (n=l06) Time 1 Time2 t p 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 37.25 8.10 37.11 7.32 -.23 .41 
Factor 2-Agreeableness 39.12 5.17 39.28 6.21 .29 .39 
Factor 3-Conscientiousness 35.08 6.91 37.88 7.28 5.46 .00 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 34.88 7.32 36.22 7.44 2.04 .02 
Factor 5-Culture/lntelligence 38.18 6.50 39.26 5.45 1.85 .03 
Table 8. 
Between Group Crossed Comparisons of Com-First (n= 148) and Psych First (n = 
131) Groups' Self-Ratings 
Com-First Time 1 Psych-First Time 2 
Mean SD Mean SD t df 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 35.61 7.50 37.11 7.32 -1.59 252 





Factor 3-Conscientiousness 34.09 5.93 37.88 7.27 -4.41 197* .00 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 34.72 7.42 36.23 7.44 -1.59 252 
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence 35.33 5.67 39.26 5.45 -5.54 252 
Com-First Time 2 Psych-First Time 1 
Mean SD Mean SD t df 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 36.31 7.23 37.53 7.86 -1.29 254 
Factor 2-Agreeableness 38.88 6.06 38.92 5.33 -.06 254 
Factor 3-Conscientiousness 38.10 7.28 35.15 6.85 3.34 254 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 35.25 7.91 35.01 6.93 .26 254 
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence 38.34 5.57 38.22 6.26 .16 254 












Within Group Comparisons by Level of Self-Monitoring 
Low Self-Monitors (n=83) Time 1 Time2 t p 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 32.54 7.02 33.02 6.80 .88 .19 
Factor 2-Agreeableness 39.61 6.29 39.88 5.81 .42 .34 
Factor 3-Conscientiousness 35.01 6.92 38.55 7.06 6.73 .00 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 32.58 7.65 33.87 8.01 2.19 .02 
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence 34.54 5.89 37.30 5.70 4.97 .00 
High Self-Monitors (n=l44) Time 1 Time2 t p 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Big Five Measures of Personality 
Factor 1-Extraversion 38.22 7.44 38.74 6.71 1.12 .13 
Factor 2-Agreeableness 37.97 5.38 38.64 6.30 1.60 .06 
Factor 3-Conscientiousness 34.37 6.15 37.68 7.35 6.92 .00 
Factor 4-Emotional Stability 35.56 7.23 36.67 7.43 2.20 .02 
Factor 5-Culture/Intelligence 37.64 6.28 39.67 5.25 4.27 .00 
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Figure 1. 
The Interdisciplinary Problem 
Psychological Perspective 





Communication Style --------11•.il Self-Concept 
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Figure 2. 
Role of Self-Monitoring 
Possible construct that may integrate both perspectives 
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